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This study addresses the persistent charge of orientalism leveled against Zionism and 
explores the relationship between orientalism and antisemitism, which Edward W. Said 
describes in his 1978 book Orientalism as that of an ironic “secret sharer.” This study 
traces that sharing back into the early modern period and posits that antisemitism and 
orientalism both came into being within the context of the Reconquista and emergent 
Western Colonialism and Imperialism. This is followed by an examination of German 
Jewish history as a colonial history, and identifies the Zionism which arose out of that 
history as distinctively non-orientalist in nature. 
1 
Introduction 
 Edward Said’s 1978 book Orientalism posits a thesis on the underlying 
culture informing Western Colonialism and Imperialism. At its core, Said 
argues, orientalism is a paradigm of representing the people of “the Orient” as 
fundamentally backward and needing the guidance of the West—and that this 
essential element animates and justifies Western Colonialism and Imperialism.1 
While ostensibly applying to the full scope of Western Colonialism and 
Imperialism more broadly, Said’s Orientalism primarily focuses on arguing 
against essentialist Western representations of Islam and Arabs.  
 Said, a Palestinian-American who lived in the United States, formulated 
his identification of orientalism as a phenomenon to be a means of supporting 
the Palestinian side of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.2 Specifically, it was an attempt 
to replicate the same sort of support within the West for the Palestinian national 
cause which Israel and Zionism then enjoyed.3 To this end, Zionism and the 
State of Israel are framed as iterations of orientalism and Western Colonialism, a 
framing which Said continued to elaborate on through the course of his life.4  
                                                 
1 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 25th Anniversary Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1994 
[1978]), 2-3. 
2 Ibid., 26-27. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See, for example Edward W. Said, “Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims,” Social Text 1 
(1979): 7-58. 
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 This is reflected in the substantial impact Edward Said’s Orientalism has 
made since its first publication. In academic terms, his book was a seminal work 
of the academic discipline that has come to be known as Postcolonial Studies. 
Against critics, Edward Said complained that they responded to Orientalism as 
though it were an “opportunity for them to defend Zionism, support Israel, and 
launch attacks on Palestinian nationalism.”5 While this is certainly true, Said 
should hardly have been surprised by this; Orientalism is at least as much an 
anti-Zionist work as it is a theory on Western Colonialism and Imperialism. This 
is well reflected within the Postcolonial Studies field, which integrated Said’s 
characterization of Israel and Zionism as iterations of Western Colonialism and 
Imperialism into its core worldview. 
 Said’s complaint is also bizarre when viewed in the context of one of his 
own observations within Orientalism: 
 I have found myself writing the history of a strange, secret sharer of 
Western antisemitism. That antisemitism and, as I have discussed it in its 
Islamic branch, Orientalism resemble each other very closely is a 
historical, cultural, and political truth that needs only to be mentioned to 
an Arab Palestinian for its irony to be perfectly understood.6 
                                                 
5 Edward W. Said, “Orientalism Reconsidered,” in Literature, Politics, and Theory: Papers from 
the Essex Conference, 1976-84, Francis Baker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iverson, and Diana 
Loxley (eds.) (New York: Methuen, 1986), 221. 
6 Said, Orientalism, 27-28. 
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Said does not linger on this comparison, as it is made primarily for dramatic 
effect. Yet, his complaint against Zionist critiques of Orientalism indicates that 
Said may not have perfectly understood the irony himself.   
 Given that Jews in Israel, and worldwide, see Zionism and the State of 
Israel as a grand repudiation of antisemitism—especially that which motivated 
Nazi Germany to perpetrate the Holocaust—it is already obvious why Said’s 
attempt to undermine the legitimacy of Israel by inverting its narrative would 
cause apoplectic reactions. This is clearly illustrated in the fact that critiques of 
Orientalism and Postcolonial Studies have operated with the general goal of 
reversing that inversion.  
 To take some recent examples, Irfan Khawaja critiques Orientalism’s 
thesis as incoherent because it remains committed to essentialism about 
orientalism while simultaneously arguing against the essentialism of 
orientalism—that it is senseless to argue that orientalism is an essential element 
of the West while also arguing against the possibility of making essentialist 
claims about Islam.7 Efraim Karsh contends Islamic Imperialism through the 
Ottoman period had a much greater impact on the Middle East than the short 
history of Western Imperialism in the region.8 David Cook and Andrew G. 
                                                 
7 Irfan Khawaja, “Essentialism, Consistency, and Islam: A Critique of Edward Said’s 
Orientalism,” in Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-Israel Conflict (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 17, 30n4. 
8 Efraim Karsh, “The Missing Piece: Islamic Imperialism,” in Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-
Israel Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
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Bostom contend that Islamic Imperialism was equivalent to Western 
Colonialism and Imperialism, thus the Palestinian presence in the area is no less 
colonial than Israel’s.9 Gideon Shimoni argues that the orientalist paradigm does 
not accurately describe or explain the Arab-Israeli Conflict as it actually exists, 
and that Zionism itself actually fits within that paradigm as a colonized victim.10 
As noted, what typifies this kind of opposition to the Said/Postcolonial Studies 
view is reversing its inversion of the Zionist narrative. 
 The Arab-Israeli Conflict has, no less surprisingly, drawn the attention of 
antisemitism scholarship. Scholars in this field have had particular trouble 
parsing the line between antisemitism and anti-Zionism. Such scholarship 
proliferated first in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, and then with heightened 
frequency after the Second Intifada and 9/11, approaching what has been 
variously identified as anti-Zionism, global antisemitism, or, most often, “new 
antisemitism.”11 This literature exhibits an undercurrent of confusion in its 
                                                 
9 David Cook, “The Muslim Man’s Burden: Muslim Intellectuals Confront their Imperialist 
Past,” in Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-Israel Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2008); 
Andrew G. Bostom, “Negating the Legacy of Jihad in Palestine,” in Postcolonial Theory and the 
Arab-Israel Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
10 Gideon Shimoni, “Postcolonial Theory and the History of Zionism,” in Postcolonial Theory 
and the Arab-Israel Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
11 Jonathan Judaken, "Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism: The Frankfurt School's Anti-
Antisemitism," in Antisemitism and Philosemitism in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries: 
Representing Jews, Jewishness, and Modern Culture, Phyllis Lassner and Lara Trubowitz (eds.) 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2008), 27, 33. The tendency of scholars to insist on 
emergent new antisemitisms extends back to the 1930s, with scholars like Max Horkheimer.  
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multiplicity, and a franticness with the continuation and escalation of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict. 
 Following the Yom Kippur War, Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. 
Epstein identified, in 1974, a “new antisemitism” pervasive on the Far-Right and 
especially on the Radical Left of the political spectrum.12 On the Left, this new 
antisemitism is animated by anti-imperialism and a sense that the Jews and 
Israel are an obstacle to the goals of revolutionary liberalism.13 Since the end of 
the “post-World War II honeymoon,” a double standard developed toward Israel 
that indicated the intention of the Radical Left to liquidate the State of Israel as 
an entity.14 Bernard Lewis, in 1986, postulated a “new antisemitism” exhibiting 
the radicalizing effect of the Arab-Israeli Conflict upon Muslim nationalism and 
Western influence upon Muslim antisemitism.15 Lewis warned that if some 
resolution was not reached in the Arab-Israeli Conflict soon, Muslim 
antisemitism was likely to become genocidal.16 
 More recently, in 2013, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen identifies all 
antisemitism, to include the “new antisemitism,” as an ideology originating 
within Christianity that is Manichean and eliminationist in nature because it 
                                                 
12 Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein. The New Anti-Semitism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1974), 6-7. 
13 Ibid., 9, 11. 
14 Ibid., 14-15, 125. 
15 Bernard Lewis, Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice (New York: 
Norton, 1986), 196, 236. 
16 Ibid., 257-259. 
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seeks the ending of the Jews in some manner or another, up to and including 
extermination.17 The “new antisemitism” is without any fixed location because 
of its inherent globalism, and its rise corresponds with America’s hegemonic 
decline because it is the only country willing or even inclined to combat it.18 
Further, Goldhagen identifies Muslim antisemitism as an indispensable part of 
the “new antisemitism,” through which it achieves its greatest and most 
intractable virulence in the form of Hamas’s genocidal designs on the Jews of 
Israel.19 The Nazification of Israel, what Goldhagen terms “the Nazified 
fantasy,” is also central to the “new antisemitism.”20 Further, rather than 
emerging all at once, this “new antisemitism” separated from previous religious 
and racial antisemitisms, gradually becoming chiefly political since the end of 
the Second World War and into the onset of globalization.21 
 There is a general consensus, then, that what typifies these “new” 
antisemitisms is the centrality of the Arab-Israeli Conflict within them. The 
question of whether anti-Zionism and antisemitism are the same phenomenon 
has caused some ontological confusion. There have been attempts to parse this 
                                                 
17 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, The Devil That Never Dies: The Rise and Threat of Global 
Antisemitism (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2013), 37, 85, 88, 94, 252. 
18 Ibid., 163, 193, 195. 
19 Ibid., 227. 
20 Ibid., 313. 
21 Ibid., 79, 145, 151, 153, 163, 360. 
7 
confusion, such as the 2007 edited volume Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism in 
Historical Perspective: Convergence and Divergence, edited by Jeffrey Herf.  
 Within this volume, Derek J. Penslar argues that the pre-World War II 
Arab attitudes toward the Jews were far less militant in that they acknowledged 
the peoplehood of the Jews and their competing claim for the land of Israel.22 
The period of the war saw a Westernization of the Arab perspective, especially 
amongst fundamentalists influenced by Nazi antisemitism, but that despite this, 
most Muslim anti-Zionism, excepting the fundamentalists, is not antisemitic.23  
 Pierre Birnbaum looks at the transition from pro-Zionism to anti-
Zionism by French antisemites on the radical right before and after the 
formation of Israel; initially, pro-Zionism arose from a desire to remove the 
Jewish contamination from France.24 The subsequent shift to anti-Zionism was 
animated by older antisemitic tropes, which considered the Israelis to be a 
powerbase of global Jewish domination, and a general disdain for the United 
States, Israel’s chief supporter.25  Overall, the consensus of Antisemitism and 
Anti-Zionism in Historical Perspective: Convergence and Divergence is that 
there is no absolute connection between antisemitism and anti-Zionism, but they 
                                                 
22 Derek J. Penslar, "Anti-Semites on Zionism: From Indifference to Obsession," in Anti-
Semitism and Anti-Zionism in Historical Perspective: Convergence and Divergence, Jeffrey 
Herf (ed.) (London: Routledge, 2007), 13. 
23 Ibid., 14-17. 
24 Pierre Birnbaum, "The French Radical Right: From Anti-Semitic Zionism to Anti-Semitic 
Anti-Zionism," in Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism in Historical Perspective: Convergence and 
Divergence, Jeffrey Herf (ed.) (London: Routledge, 2007), 145. 
25 Ibid., 151. 
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can and do often overlap. While a laudable attempt, this appears to highlight the 
ontological confusion, rather than make much headway in dispelling it. 
 Indeed, the problem of parsing anti-Zionism has even led to an apparent 
inability to consistently identify antisemitism. For example, Daniel Jonah 
Goldhagen’s refusal to entertain the notion that Christian Zionism can be 
anything other than philosemitism, despite the centrality of Christianity within 
his own ontology for antisemitism—certainly support for Israel based on an 
eschatological hope that ends in the ultimate destruction of Jews is no less 
eliminationist than the global antisemitism Goldhagen postulates.26 Also, Steven 
K. Baum, founder of the Society for the Study of Antisemitism, asserted in 2012 
that “[w]hile all antisemites are anti-Israeli, the obverse does not follow.”27 Two 
things appear to be at play here: categorization in antisemitism scholarship, and 
a dearth of attention to philosemitism within that scholarship. 
Antisemitism scholarship maintains a categorical separation between 
Christian antisemitism and racial antisemitism.28 This corresponds to the coining 
of the term in 1879 by Wilhelm Marr to differentiate his ostensibly novel 
rejection of the Jews on the basis of race rather than Christianity.29 Antisemitism 
                                                 
26 Goldhagen, The Devil That Never Dies: The Rise and Threat of Global Antisemitism, 246. 
27 Steven K. Baum and Shimon Samuels, Antisemitism Explained (Lanham, Md.: University 
Press of America, 2012), 187. 
28Jerome A. Chanes, Antisemitism: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-
CLIO, 2004), 5-6. 
29 Ibid., 2. 
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scholarship also tends to exclude philosemitism from its overall analysis.30 
These two elements have led to broader ontological issues, which work dealing 
with anti-Zionism reflects. These issues have negatively impacted the ontology 
of antisemitism so severely that encyclopedias on the subject consider any 
attempt to even define antisemitism as being, at best, arbitrary.31 This warrants 
attention.  
 One of the primary components of Christian antisemitism’s doctrine of 
deicide (the charge that all Jews are culpable for the murder of God in the 
person of Christ) is that it is an inherited guilt.32 This is held to be in distinction 
from racial antisemitism because that guilt is washed away at the baptismal font. 
However, this distinction does not hold up to scrutiny. For example, laws based 
upon the pureza de sangre (purity of blood) discourse of early modern Spain 
illustrate at least some racial aspect within Christian antisemitism.  Jerome 
Friedman illustrates in a study on the subject:  
This understanding of Jewishness was explained by Fray Prudencio de 
Sandoval, Charles V's biographer, who wrote in 1604, "Who can deny 
that in the descendants of the Jews there persists and endures the evil 
inclination of their ancient ingratitude and lack of understanding, just as 
in Negros [there persists] the inseparability of their blackness…it is not 
enough for the Jew to be three parts aristocrat or Old Christian for one 
family-line [i.e., one Jewish ancestor] alone defiles and corrupts him.” 
Consequently, "it is not necessary to be of a Jewish father and mother . . . 
                                                 
30 Jonathan Karp, Philosemitism in History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1-2.  
31 Richard Levy, Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution (Santa 
Barbara, California: ABC-Clio, 2005), XXIX. 
32 Robert Michael, Holy Hatred: Christianity, Antisemitism, and the Holocaust (New York, 
N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 10, 17-19.  
10 
half is enough and even if not that much, a quarter is sufficient or even 
an eighth.”33 
This clearly illustrates that there was some sort of racial theory attached to 
Jewishness at least as early as 1604.34 This racial theory extended to arguments 
that prominent Jewish figures in Christianity, such as Jesus and Paul, were 
somehow biologically different from other Jews.35 If this categorical problem of 
ontology requires additional attention, as it clearly does, what of philosemitism? 
 The pool of scholarship on philosemitism remains small, and revolves 
around the ontological problem of identifying the phenomenon’s existence in 
history. Alan Levenson’s approach to this problem generated a core definition of 
philosemitism as “any pro-Jewish or pro-Judaic utterance or act,” regardless of 
whether or not the actor in question would identify as a philosemite (and even if 
said actor would identify as an antisemite, for that matter), which other scholars 
                                                 
33 Jerome Friedman, "Jewish Conversion, the Spanish Pure Blood Laws and Reformation: A 
Revisionist View of Racial and Religious Antisemitism," The Sixteenth Century Journal 18 no. 1 
(1987): 3-30, 16-17; See also Hyam Maccoby, Antisemitism and Modernity: Innovation and 
Continuity (London: Routledge, 2006); While the codification of racial laws dealing with “purity 
of blood” were termed limpieza de sangre, this reflected legal terminology—beginning in 
medieval Spain and carrying forward into the Spanish and Portuguese empires where the 
limpieiza terminology reflected a pseudoscientific designation of blood content by ratio. For the 
purposes of approaching the cultural discourse that generated such laws, this thesis utilizes the 
term pureza de sangre.  
34 Ibid. Friedman goes so far as to assert that the “pure blood laws” were entirely about a theory 
of heredity and race, and that religious matters were actually of no real concern. This goes too 
far. Rather, it is important to understand that these two concerns were in actuality inseparable 
elements of Spanishness. 
35 Ibid., 18; This theme has remained a consistent part of modern antisemitism, including within 
Germany. See, for example Susannah Heschel, The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the 
Bible in Nazi Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
11 
on the phenomenon have accepted provisionally.36 Jonathan Judaken expands 
this to see philosemitism as a belief system that views Jews and Jewishness in 
typologically positive terms.37 Judaken’s expansion is a reasonable one. 
However, its application threatens to render philosemitism almost 
phenomenologically non-existent. While Judaken’s formulation obviously and 
immediately excludes “philosemites” such as Goldhagen’s Christian Zionists, it 
also seriously challenges the basic ontology of antisemitism. 
 This is best exemplified by looking at a case widely considered 
emblematic of philosemitism: the Dreyfusards. These Frenchmen who publicly 
defended the falsely accused and imprisoned French Jewish officer Alfred 
Dreyfus are remembered as the philosemitic heroes of the great antisemitic 
spasm that marred the liberalism of France and split France in twain: into the 
France of Liberté, égalité, fraternité; and the France of the anti-Dreyfusards.38  
 However, recent scholarship on the Dreyfus Affair has called the “two 
Frances” dichotomy into question.39 Ruth Harris observes that some of the most 
prominent Dreyfusards began the Affair as ardent antisemites, and remained so 
throughout it.40 They were unconcerned with benefitting the Jew qua Jew, and 
                                                 
36 Alan T. Levenson, Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism: Defenses of Jews and Judaism in 
Germany, 1871-1932 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004 [2013]), xii; Judaken, 
"Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism,” 27. 
37 Judaken, "Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism,” 40. 
38 Ruth Harris, Dreyfus (London: Allen Lane, 2008). 
39 Ibid., 7. 
40 Ibid. 
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acted instead to support and protect the Revolution from the Right.41 As a 
particular example, Émile Zola remains the most famous “philosemite” for 
publicly charging the French government with antisemitism in his open letter, 
"J'accuse ...!"; yet, he wrote against antisemitism on the logic that the Jews 
would have finally and rightfully disappeared from the world had their 
“Jewishness” not been reinforced through maltreatment.42 Georges Benjamin 
Clemenceau expressed the value of the liberal cause over a physical Dreyfus 
when he quipped, “I am indifferent about Dreyfus, let them cut him to pieces 
and eat him.”43 Fernand Labori came to resent what he felt was the Jewish 
Dreyfusards’ regard only for Jewish interests.44  
 A number of Dreyfusards became actively hostile toward the man after 
his ultimate pardon, and derided him for his Jewish “tribalism,” because he did 
not want to move forward with subsequent legal battles over his innocence in 
the name of liberty.45 Georges Picquart, the lieutenant colonel and former 
instructor of Dreyfus who became instrumental in the latter’s ultimate pardon by 
discovering the real traitor, remarked, “I knew one day I would be attacked by 
the Jews and notably by the Dreyfuses.”46 All of this seems to indicate that 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 382-383. 
42 Levenson, Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism,  96. 
43 Harris, Dreyfus, 337. 
44 Ibid., 351.  
45 Ibid., 353. 
46 Ibid., 356. 
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Dreyfusard “philosemitism” was based on antisemitic premises, as it saw the 
dissolution of Jewishness as a social good. Such philosemitism was clearly 
conditional on Alfred Dreyfus’s utility as a weapon in his supporter’s contest 
with the Right. 
 The Dreyfusards illustrate that any “philosemitism” that is pro-Jew for 
any reason, or in any way, other than qua Jew, is in fact actually antisemitic. 
This is because such “philosemitism” seeks to unmake Jewishness or the Jews 
existentially for some “greater” purpose. This thoroughly, yet necessarily, 
qualifies Levenson’s core definition in a way that also makes use of Judaken’s 
more phenomenological perspective: philosemitism is any act or utterance that is 
genuinely pro-Jew qua Jew. This makes the landscape of philosemitism barren 
indeed. It is immediately clear that this pro-Jew qua Jew problem exerts a very 
strong influence on antisemitism scholarship’s attempts to parse anti-Zionism. 
As ideologies that have been viewed as historically philosemitic, such as 
European liberalism, have increasingly aligned themselves against Israel in the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, it has been impossible for antisemitism scholars to 
overlook the anti-Zionism of European liberals in the same way that the 
antisemitism of liberals like the Dreyfusards has been overlooked. This has led 
antisemitism scholarship to an assessment of an emergent need for a 
14 
“sophisticated” and complex definition of antisemitism.47 Leaving aside, for a 
moment, Edward Said’s partisanship in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, does his 
estimation of the “secret sharer” relationship have anything to offer in dealing 
with ontological problems in antisemitism scholarship? If so, it will requiring 
establishing common ground. 
 Even at first glance, the restrictive definition of philosemitism, allowing 
as it does for both Wilhelm Marr and Émile Zola to be identified as antisemites, 
hints at common ground in an immediately visible parallel between these two 
figures and Said’s formulation of orientalism’s blend of hostility and 
paternalism. While this is interesting, it is insufficient to establish a true 
common ground between antisemitism and orientalism. Gideon Shimoni’s 
critique of the Postcolonial Studies outlook offers an opportunity to establish 
that common ground. If the postcolonial paradigm can be applied to Zionism, 
then it should be possible to demonstrate that the history of European Jewry is a 
colonial history.  
 There is a growing amount of scholarship dealing with European Jews, 
and especially German Jews, as a colonized population. One of these scholars, 
Jonathan M. Hess, even goes so far as to identify antisemitism and orientalism 
                                                 
47 Kenneth L. Marcus, "The Definition of Antisemitism," in Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of 
Modernity, Charles Asher Small (ed.) (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 91. 
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as “mutually determining discourses.”48 While promising, this path presents 
potential problems. Such studies as Hess’s are themselves conducted within the 
Postcolonial Studies framework, and thus suffer from some particularly Saidian 
temporal problems. These scholars limit themselves to the eighteenth century as 
a cut-off point for the beginnings of the colonization of German Jewry. This is a 
reflection of Said, who, while acknowledging a Christian basis for orientalism, 
places the same general temporal limit on his own framework.49 Be that as it 
may, these limits are far too narrow for mapping out the history of German 
Jewry’s colonization. Certainly, any discourse in German society on the 
emancipation—or decolonization—of the Jewish population would have to 
come after their colonization, rather than in tandem with it.  
 Notably, this temporal problem is similar to the one seen in antisemitism 
scholarship in its ontological problem with separating Christian and racial 
antisemitism—to the extent that they are nearly contemporaneous. This common 
temporal issue brings a common ground between both into view. 
 Taking Jonathan M. Hess’s assessment that antisemitism and orientalism 
are “mutually determining discourses” as a guideline, it stands to reason that 
each should have a common modern origin. However, as we have seen, 
                                                 
48 Jonathan M. Hess, “Johann David Michaelis and the Colonial Imaginary: Orientalism and the 
Emergence of Racial Antisemitism in Eighteenth-Century Germany,” Jewish Social Studies, 
New Series 6, no. 2 (2000): 56-101, 93. 
49 Said, Orientalism, 333. Even twenty-five years after its initial publication, Said was placing 
the advent of modern Orientalism at so late a date as 1798. 
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antisemitism scholarship and Postcolonial Studies set these origins apart from 
each other—though the temporal distance is relatively small. In addressing this 
problem, it is reasonable to track backward in time in search of a point of nexus 
for this modern divergence. 
  In the case of orientalism, this presents potential difficulties, as different 
iterations of Western Colonialism and Imperialism begin at different times. 
Indeed, this is the root of Postcolonial Studies’ temporal confusion—Edward 
Said places orientalism chiefly in the context of the Western incursion into the 
Muslim and Arab world, yet this time frame represents a very late phase of the 
overall enterprise of Western Colonialism and Imperialism. This problem is best 
addressed, then, by following the unbroken continuity of European Jewish 
experience across the modern period. In doing so, we are looking for a location 
in modern history where both antisemitism and orientalism were physically co-
incident, a place and time that allows us to get to the heart of Jonathan M. 
Hess’s mutual determinism. Does such a nexus exist? Indeed, it does.  
 Rather than existing as ironic “secret sharers,” antisemitism and 
orientalism are, in fact, twins of a common birth—that of Western Colonialism 
and Imperialism itself, during the early modern period. Exploring this birth, 
during the transitional period between the completion of the Reconquista and the 
expansion of the Spanish and Portuguese empires, offers resolution to the 
ontological problems within scholarship dealing with both phenomena, and 
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resolves the dispute over identification of Zionism with orientalism and Western 
Colonialism—it is neither. 
 Part One of this study deals with the Reconquista, the nascent empires 
that grew out of its completion, and their role in the twin births of both modern 
antisemitism and orientalism, and derives working redefinitions of each. This 
section continues on to identify the historical precedent of Jewish 
anticolonialism amongst conversos of the early Jesuit order, including their 
attempt to save themselves and the natives of Colonial Latin America from the 
worst ravages of Spanish colonization. 
 Part Two of this study approaches the history of German Jewry as a 
colonial history, from its appropriate origin point during the Age of 
Mercantilism. The emancipation discourse is identified as a fundamentally 
antisemitic discourse of colonization, elaborating upon the contours of German 
Jewish anticolonialism through its major Haskalah and Wissenschaft des 
Judentums phases, before addressing the question of German Jewish orientalism 
directly, and illustrating that scholarly identifications of orientalism among 
German Jewish anticolonialists arose from a general failure to recognize both 
their positive (and non-orientalist) assessment of Muslim Spain, and that these 
anticolonials were forced to accept the basic antisemitic premises within 
German society to even engage in the emancipation discourse. This, rather than 
orientalism, animated German Jewish relations with the Ostjuden. This section 
18 
then moves on to the development of Zionism as a nationalist turn in German 
Jewish anticolonialism, demonstrating its lack of orientalism in continuity with 
the broader history of German Jewish anticolonialism.  
 Finally, a concluding discussion is offered on Theodor Herzl’s approach 
to Islam, and the continuity of Zionist anticolonialism into the Mandatory Period 
and Statehood. This includes an illustration of how the Zionist view of history in 
the context of the Holocaust has resulted in the misidentification of German 
Jewish self-hatred in a manner similar to how the Palestinian view of history in 
the context of the Nakba has resulted in the misidentification of Zionism as a 
manifestation of orientalism and Western Colonialism and Imperialism. 
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PART I: The Twin Births of Antisemitism and Orientalism 
 The Reconquista must be understood as the opening act of Western 
Colonialism and Imperialism if the nexus of antisemitism and orientalism is to 
be successfully identified. The Reconquista was the centuries-long retaking, by 
Christendom, of the Iberian Peninsula from the various Islamic powers that had 
taken possession of the territory in the eighth century. It was during the final 
century of the Reconquista, culminating in the final surrender of the Emirate of 
Granada in 1492, and the century after, that the internal colonization of Spain 
and Portugal would come to relative completion and turn outward to grow into 
what became known as the Portuguese and Spanish empires. This period saw the 
concurrent development of what have come to be known as modern 
antisemitism and orientalism, as well as Western Colonialism and Imperialism.   
The Advent of Modern Antisemitism 
 The issue of pureza de sangre, briefly discussed in the Introduction for 
its thorough blurring of the line between Christian and racial antisemitism, 
began as a discourse at the end of the fourteenth century. In 1391, a wave of 
pogroms (anti-Jewish riots) motivated by the Christian idea of Jewish culpability 
for deicide (the Crucifixion), precipitated a mass of conversions to Catholicism 
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amongst Jews trying to escape the violence.50 This deicide concept within 
Christian antisemitism is the key component of the process of racializing the 
Jews of Iberia and Europe as a whole, forming the core of the pureza de sangre 
cultural discourse. Within Catholic doctrine, the guilt from the sin of deicide 
passed through the blood to each new generation of Jews. While this was 
common throughout all of Christendom, there are particular elements of the 
history of the Jews of Iberia which caused the racialized aspect of modern 
antisemitism to manifest so readily. 
 By the time of the 1391 pogroms and the subsequent droves of conversos 
it created, Iberian Jews had already been particularly racialized in Iberia for 
centuries. This manifested in two particular ways during the pre-modern period. 
The first stretches all the way back to the Visigothic period, when Iberian Jewry 
attempted, without success, to invoke the Catholic doctrine of deicide in the 
defense of their own community. Their logic was that because Iberian Jews had 
already been established on the peninsula well in advance of the birth of Christ, 
the ancestors of Iberian Jewry were not responsible for the Crucifixion—
therefore, the inherited sin of deicide was absent from their blood.51 The second 
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aspect of Iberian Jewish racialization in the eyes of the Christian population was 
inextricably tied to the Islamic conquest of the peninsula and the subsequent 
Reconquista. During the Muslim invasion, Jews allied themselves with the 
Islamic conquerors, believing that life under Muslim rule would be an 
improvement over Visigothic oppression.52 Within the Iberian Christian mind, 
this made Iberian Jewry blood-traitors and a fifth column during the 
Reconquista…in addition to the inherited taint of deicide guilt.53 This 
exceptionally strong sense of inherited Jewish infidelity in the eyes of Iberian 
Christians interfered with the more traditional Catholic doctrine that conversion 
washed away Jewishness at the baptismal font. 
 The enormous growth of the converso population, unparalleled in 
Europe, created an affluent segment of the population with strong financial and 
political ties to royalty—whose incessant military campaigns against the Islamic 
enemy had dire need of such a resource.54 Resentment amongst Old Christians 
(of Gentile background) in Toledo toward the high position of New Christians 
(of Jewish, and later Muslim, background), had grown to a fever pitch by 1349. 
Old Christians, convinced of the intractable perfidy inherent to the Jewish 
heritage of New Christians, exploded into an anti-converso pogrom.55  In the 
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wake of these riots, the city council, citing the inborn impossibility for 
conversos to manifest genuine Christian fidelity, passed laws banning conversos 
and their descendants from holding public offices or testifying in Christian 
courts of law.56 
 These laws sparked intense debate across Iberia about the nature of 
converso piety and whether or not conversion did indeed wash away Jewishness. 
Arguments ranged from full support of the converso population as an 
unequivocally legitimate part of the Christian whole, to those upholding the 
view of Toledo—asserting that the taint of Jewishness in the blood persisted for 
generations, racially predisposing conversos toward false piety and Jewish 
customs.57 As this debate raged, Aragon and Castile joined through the marriage 
of its monarchs, and modern Spain was born. Very quickly, through the course 
of this pureza de sangre discourse, positive Spanishness within Spain began to 
become defined in terms of contra-Jewishness, with Jewishness representing 
everything negative in society.58 It was in this context of the discourse that the 
Spanish Inquisition came into being as an attempt at compromise. At its 
inception in 1480, the Inquisition took up a middle ground on the matter of 
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pureza de sangre, viewing converso impiety as a racially inherited propensity, 
but not as an absolute.59 The Inquisition was thus tasked with seeking out and 
expunging this propensity where made manifest in the heretical retention of 
Jewish practices and customs (Judaizing) among conversos, which was taken to 
be a dire threat to the security, and even the identity, of Catholic Spain.60 
 Twelve years later, the completion of the Reconquista had driven the last 
bastion of Islamic power out of the Iberian Peninsula in 1492. Catholic Spain 
would no longer suffer the presence of Jews within its realm, and thus they were 
delivered an ultimatum to accept baptism or face expulsion.61 This watershed 
replicated 1391 on a peninsular scale. Though the Jews were now gone, the 
threat to Catholic Spain was even greater—conversos spread throughout the 
land, freshly converted en masse with little to no sense of Catholic orthodoxy, 
the threat of Judaizing to the security and identity of Catholic Spain was now 
endemic.62 The Spanish Inquisition responded in kind, ceasing to be a middle 
ground on the matter of the pureza de sangre.63 By 1547, Juan Martínez Silíceo, 
the Inquisitor General of Spain and Archbishop of Toledo, had gained the upper 
hand with his argument that even the descendants of formerly Jewish converts 
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“still hold on their lips the milk of their ancestors’ recent perversity.” 64 On this 
basis, the Limpieza de Sangre Statutes were promulgated as the law of Spanish 
Catholic lands—with the approval of King Philip II and of the Pope in Rome.65  
A Working Redefinition of Antisemitism 
 We see then, already fully articulated in 1547, the racially based modern 
antisemitism which would only be given a distinctive designation in Germany 
more than three centuries later. Indeed, the contours of the pureza de sangre 
discourse are identical to those of the emancipation discourse in Germany. 
Returning to the idea covered during the discussion of philosemitism within the 
Introduction, the “Jew qua Jew” paradigm is ultimately a position on 
Jewishness. Notably, in the same way that the Dreyfusards would centuries later 
be prepared to accept any assimilated Jew who was expunged of Jewishness, the 
Spanish Inquisition was prepared to accept any converted Jew who was likewise 
expunged of Jewishness.  
 The central matter, then, is Jewishness—however it is defined. The 
central concern of the pureza de sangre discourse was how to resolve the 
negativity of Jewishness within Spanish society—a theme we will also see 
within the emancipation debate in Germany. These discourses are fundamentally 
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antisemitic, because they were debates about the capacity of Jews to be divested 
of enough of their Jewishness to even be a part of society at all—working from 
the assumption that Jewishness itself was negative. With this in mind, a core 
working definition derives: 
Antisemitism is: 
1. The attribution of an inherent negativity to Jewishness; 
and 
2. The sentiment that this negativity must be resolved. 
Within the context of this redefinition of antisemitism, any act or utterance that 
inheres both of the above two elements is antisemitic. Such a redefinition is 
highly versatile by virtue both of its simplicity and its specificity. 
 In addition to being capable of identifying otherwise disparate 
antisemites such as Marr and Zola, this redefinition allows a more certain means 
of parsing anti-Zionism. For example: both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas 
see the existence of a Jewish state as inherently negative. However, only Hamas 
seeks to resolve that negativity by dissolving that state by any and all means. 
The Palestinian Authority, by contrast, has opted instead to pursue the erection 
of an adjacent Palestinian state. Put simply, antisemitic anti-Zionism would be 
any act or utterance that is anti-Israel qua Jewish state. 
 Having now articulated a straightforward and truly robust redefinition of 
antisemitism, attention can turn to the advent of orientalism. 
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The Advent of Modern Orientalism 
 The taking of the Emirate of Granada saw the same forced conversion 
among Muslims that had also occurred among Jews. These Muslim converts, 
known as moriscos, faced problems similar to those of the conversos. Even after 
the close of the Reconquista, Spain remained engaged—along with Latin 
Christendom at large—in military contests with Islamic, and especially 
Ottoman, powers. This persistent threat had a particular effect on the 
construction of Spanish identity throughout the sixteenth century. In much the 
same manner that contra-Jewishness had come to define Spanishness within 
Spain—contra-Islam came to define Spanishness outside of Spain.66 This 
paradigm intensified after Spanish fears of the external Islamic threat led to 
widespread panic over an imagined morisco uprising in 1580.67 Spain became so 
thoroughly committed to placing the Islamic literally outside of Spanishness that 
it ultimately decided that it would rather expel its converted Muslim (morisco) 
population at the beginning of the seventeenth century, at substantial economic 
loss, than retain anything that appeared Islamic within its heartland.68 Conversos 
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did not face similar mass expulsion; rather, Spain remained committed to 
purging conversos of their Jewishness and completing their forced colonization. 
 Because of the pervasive Spanish sense that moriscos remained 
inherently threatening, there was little real interest in assimilating the morisco 
population, or facilitating their integration into Spanish Catholic society—with 
the notable exception of converso Jesuits, which is discussed below. The core of 
this was a racial conflation similar to that directed at the conversos. To Spanish 
society, moriscos carried within them the blood not only of Spain’s external 
Islamic enemy, but the same blood as the Muslims who invaded Iberia in the 
first place. No amount of Catholic orthodoxy could expunge the sin of that 
invasion. In this way, Spanish attitudes toward the moriscos were very similar to 
the pureza de sangre discourse of racialized Jewishness, including its focus on 
the Muslim conquest of Iberia. Notably, moriscos attempted to marshal a 
defense of themselves very similar to the one that Jews attempted to use 
previously.  
 Near the end of the sixteenth century, moriscos claimed to have made a 
startling discovery proving a pre-Islamic Arab presence in Iberia. More than 
that, the Lead Books of Sacramonte purported to show that it was in fact Arabs 
who brought Christianity to Iberia in the first place.69 Moriscos argued that the 
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implications of this discovery were two-fold: first, the Arab heritage of moriscos 
was pre-Islamic and thus untainted by the sin of the Islamic invasion; second, as 
the progenitors of Christianity in Iberia, a Catholic of Arab descent was 
unquestionably Spanish in nature.70 Such argumentation did the moriscos no 
more good in the sixteenth century than it did the Jews centuries before. Within 
a handful of years, morisco populations were being expelled from Spain en 
masse, decades before the Vatican had even ruled the Lead Books of Sacramonte 
to be forgeries.71  
 Certainly, we can see in early modern Spain elements of Edward Said’s 
orientalism, at least in terms of its direction particularly at Arabs and Islam—as 
well as in the conflation of the two. Within the broader context of the advent of 
Western Colonialism and Imperialism during this period, we can see the origin 
of orientalism in its fuller scope. 
 The successful completion of the Reconquista did much to cement 
Spain’s reputation, and that of Portugal, within Christendom’s larger ongoing 
confrontation with Islamic power during the fifteenth and sixteenth century—
during which the capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453 had sent 
Latin Christendom into a panic.72 The overseas expansion of both Spanish and 
Portuguese territory, and power, were explicitly framed as counterpoints to 
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negate what was increasingly seen as the global threat of Islamic power—to, in 
effect, neutralize the threat of Islam by Christianizing the world out from under 
it.73  
 Indeed, the Papal Bull Romanus Pontifex defined the colonial and 
imperial enterprises as an effort “[…] to invade, search out, capture, vanquish, 
and subdue all Saracens [Muslims] and pagans whatsoever, and other enemies of 
Christ wheresoever placed […].”74 Notably, these pagans were specifically to be 
those “[…] who are entirely free from infection by the sect of the most impious 
Mahomet […]” in order to prevent Islam from gaining these peoples and 
territories for itself.75 Within Romanus Pontifex, it is apparent that Latin 
Christendom was already conceiving of itself collectively as “Westerners” 
arrayed against the power of an Islamic East by 1455.76  By the latter half of the 
sixteenth century, both the colonial expansion of Spain into pagan lands and its 
key role in a number of major naval victories over Ottoman forces gained Spain 
the reputation as an exemplar of the emergent West.77  
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Reformulating Edward Said: A Working Redefinition of Orientalism 
 While all of these elements fall within the purview of Edward Said’s 
definition of modern orientalism in more or less broad strokes, there are 
particular differences that need to be dealt with, leading to a working 
redefinition of orientalism itself. First, and perhaps most relevant, these 
elements of Said’s modern orientalism can be seen operating in a fully 
articulated form some three centuries before the time frame Said placed its 
origins in the late eighteenth century.78 Further, the elements that Said identifies 
as central to modern orientalism, such as “race, color, origin, temperament, 
character, and types,” were already present by the mid-fifteenth century—as we 
saw in our discussion of the status of both conversos and moriscos in Spain.79 
That Latin Christendom was already defining itself as a West in terms of an 
opposed East at the onset of Western Colonialism and Imperialism ultimately 
destroys Said’s ontology of modern orientalism.  
 Edward Said contends that orientalism developed at the height of 
Western Colonial and Imperial power as a discourse justifying the power 
relationship of the West over the rest.80 However, we can see the constituent 
elements of that discourse fully articulated and active in a historical moment 
where not only was the power of the West far from dominant, it was not yet 
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clear whether or not this emergent West would even survive its contest with the 
Islamic East. Indeed, the logic of Pope Nicolas V in issuing Romanus Pontifex, 
and later Papal Bulls issued by subsequent popes, was based on an assessment 
that Latin Christendom would likely lose its contest with Islam without colonial 
expansion into pagan lands.81 Moreover, it is clear that modern orientalism as a 
discourse arose as a part of that contest, rather than post facto from a place of 
Western hegemony.   
 Said’s temporal fallacy is tied to his formulation of modern orientalism 
as a thoroughly secular phenomenon, though this identification also crumbles in 
the face of modern orientalism’s emphatically Latin Christian origin. Said insists 
that Christianity by itself was too conceptually narrow to allow for the advent of 
modern orientalism in the absence of the “secularizing elements in eighteenth-
century Europe.”82 In his estimation, such secularizing elements were required 
to produce modern orientalism because they overwhelmed the basic 
categorization within Christianity of “Christians and everyone else.”83  
 Yet, such a simple categorization is utterly absent from the Latin 
Christendom which inaugurated Western Colonialism and Imperialism in the 
fifteenth century. If we include Jews, the first victims of this colonial enterprise 
during the course of the Reconquista, with the categories identified in the 
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Romanus Pontifex, we find that there are in fact four categories: 1) Christians, 2) 
Jews, 3) Muslims, and 4) pagans. It is within the interplay of these categories 
that orientalism (and antisemitism) are located. Let us take Spanish colonialism 
as our example of this interplay: 1) Catholic Spanishness is defined as 2) contra-
Jewishness; Spain itself is defined as 3) contra-Islam, through combat and 4) its 
expansion into and conversion of pagan lands. Those elements identified by Said 
as modern orientalism correspond to categories three and four. From this, a 
definition derives: 
Orientalism is: 
1. The attribution of an inherent existential threat from the Islamic that 
must be neutralized; 
and 
2. The sentiment that this threat can only be neutralized by supplanting 
its power through global hegemony.  
Notably absent from this redefinition is the primacy that Edward Said attributes 
to the ascribed “backwardness” of colonized people as a justification for 
Western Colonialism and Imperialism. While this quickly developed as a 
common feature of orientalist discourse across time, it did not gain the same 
level of immutability found within antisemitism toward the Jews or in 
orientalism toward Muslims. Because of this, it is not integral enough to be 
definitional.  
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 Indeed, because Latin Christendom had virtually no contemporary 
experience in interacting with pagan populations prior to the advent of Western 
Colonialism and Imperialism, its conception of pagan populations was very 
much in flux at the outset. This becomes evident when looking at converso 
Jesuit activity in Colonial Latin America. First, we must look at the early Jesuit 
order as a site of refuge and anticolonial criticism for conversos in Spain. 
The Early Jesuits as a Precedent for Jewish Anticolonialism 
 It may not be immediately sensible to turn to a Catholic religious order 
and apostates from Judaism as a site of Jewish anticolonialism, especially in a 
Spain from which Jews had already been expelled some four decades prior. 
However, it must be borne in mind that conversions were made by Jews as a 
means to fully enter Spanish society, and that such conversos remained subject 
to legal exclusions and the terrors of the Spanish Inquisition on account of their 
perceived Jewishness—in racial terms. As a class of people within Spanish 
society, these conversos remained a subject population long after the initial 
colonizing projects of the Reconquista and forced conversion had come to 
completion. Moreover, the particular contours of Jewish anticolonialism of the 
emancipatory variety are on full display amongst the converso Jesuits, as made 
clear below.  
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The Early Jesuit Order as a Converso Refuge 
The Society of Jesus was founded in 1540 by Ignatius of Loyola, at the 
height of the pureza de sangre discourse.84 Loyola himself may have been a 
converso from his mother’s side, though later Jesuit purges of records detailing 
conversos in the early order have left this unclear.85 Whatever the case, as a 
young man, Ignatius found his spiritual calling in a converso milieu through the 
more spiritually inclined alumbrado movement, contributing to “a large web of 
Loyola’s converso connections” and an enduring affinity for conversos.86 Such 
connections brought the Spanish Inquisition to bear upon Ignatius repeatedly 
before he founded the Society of Jesus, though he was never pronounced guilty 
of Judaizing.87 
At least a third of the six founding members of the Society of Jesus were 
conversos.88 Diego Laínez and Nicolás Bobadil were for certain, and Simão 
Rodrigues and Alfonso Salmeron may have been conversos as well.89 Of the 
founding group, only Peter Faber, from France, was not Spanish. As such, the 
group was very aware of the growing threat the pureza de sangre discourse 
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posed to conversos in Spanish society. Indeed, Ignatius was not the only 
founding member with personal experience of the Spanish Inquisition. Several 
members of Diego Laínez’s family were tried and sentenced for Judaizing by 
the Spanish Inquisition.90 
Ignatius sought to make his order a refuge for conversos, and his 
commitment to their entry into the Jesuit order was unwavering. As the pureza de 
sangre discourse intensified, Ignatius began funneling conversos wishing to join 
the Society out of hot spots in Spain to safety.91 Iberian conversos flowed into this 
new refuge. While it is impossible to know the exact number of conversos within 
the early Society of Jesus, again due to subsequent Jesuit document purges, 
Maryks identified at least eighty-seven conversos who entered the Society before 
such entry was banned.92 Indeed, entire generations of some converso families 
fled to the Society. For example, while José de Acosta is best remembered among 
them, a total of five sons of the de Acosta family became Jesuits.93 
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The Early Jesuit Order and the Pureza de Sangre Discourse 
Though the Society of Jesus was a sanctuary for conversos from its 
inception, stirrings of an anti-converso faction manifested quickly as the Society 
became widely known as a converso refuge and drew the attention of the Spanish 
Inquisition.94 As this attention grew more intense, the superior provincial of the 
Jesuits in Spain, Antonio de Araoz, who would later lead the anti-converso 
faction, suggested to Ignatius that pureza de sangre restrictions should be placed 
on entry, at least where the Spanish Inquisition was in force.95 As this was 
antithetical to Ignatius’s very purpose, he refused.  
 Later, Grand Inquisitor Juan Martínez Silíceo threatened to have the 
Society ejected from Spain if Ignatius continued to admit conversos.96 Ignatius 
was flippant in response, directing one of the most powerful men in Spain to 
“apply himself to understanding his own affairs.”97 Enraged, Silíceo was 
prepared to burn Jesuits operating in Spain en masse in response, alleging all 
were of converso background.98 Ultimately, a compromise was made—
conversos were funneled to other places, such as Rome, where they could join 
the Society out of the reach of Spain’s obsession with pureza de sangre.99 
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 After the death of Ignatius in 1556, Araoz lead a small but growing anti-
converso movement within the Society of Jesus.100 This faction was not 
immediately successful. This was due in no small part to the fact that the second 
Superior General, Diego Laínez, was a known converso. The third Superior 
General, Francisco de Borja, while not a converso, shared Ignatius’s pro-
converso spirit.101 With the election of the fourth Superior General in 1573, 
however, the anti-converso faction was powerful enough to block the election of 
converso Juan Alfonso de Polanca.102 The anti-converso faction succeeded in 
pushing through Everard Mercurian as Superior General.103 This marked a 
decline in the status of conversos within the Society, culminating in the adoption 
of pureza de sangre restrictions in 1593, barring converso entry into the Society. 
Mercurian set about to “cleanse the house,” depriving conversos of 
governmental posts in Europe.104 Many of these conversos were reassigned to 
work in Colonial Latin America, far from the European centers of Jesuit 
power—especially in Peru.105 From this point on, the status of the Jesuit order as 
a refuge for conversos was at an end. 
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 The early Society of Jesus, in which conversos were so prominent, 
functioned as a site of Jewish anticolonialism. Notably, the absence of actual Jews 
in Spain was irrelevant to its antisemitism—the ascribed Jewishness of the 
conversos was more than sufficient. These conversos were forced to defend 
themselves against a charge of lingering and inherent Jewishness. Conversos 
came to understand that a full emancipation into Spanish society was contingent 
upon society at large perceiving them as sufficiently Catholic as to no longer be 
seen as Jewish.106 Moreover, they went on to attempt to convey this understanding 
to other groups and peoples who found themselves colonized under the Spanish 
and Portuguese imperial yokes.  
Early Converso Jesuit Anticolonialism 
 The Society of Jesus came relatively late to the possessions of the 
Spanish and Portuguese empires, created as it was after these colonial 
enterprises had begun.107 During his lifetime, Ignatius’s attitude on the matter of 
non-European converts was as unequivocal as his attitude toward conversos.  
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There was doubt expressed by Francis Xavier, in racialized terms, about the 
capacity for the native subjects of Portuguese India to be genuine converts or 
suitable for entry into the Jesuit order.108 Ignatius was unreceptive to such 
arguments, and ordered that Indian initiates were “not to be received less 
willingly than the old Christians...”109 
 This directive made clear that Ignatius disdained racial targeting of all 
people within the Spanish and Portuguese realms. Notably, Ignatius did 
recommend a probationary period for new converts to allow them to accumulate 
a high degree of Catholic orthodoxy.110  This probationary period reflects both the 
converso experience and Jesuit attempts to aid Spanish moriscos. One of the 
hallmarks of the Spanish Inquisition was harsh enforcement of orthodoxy against 
erstwhile Jewish and Muslim populations too recently converted to have possibly 
assimilated to the strictures of their new religion. The Catholic Church in Spain, 
and the other religious orders, left moriscos to their own devices and at the mercy 
of the Spanish Inquisition. The Jesuit order alone intervened, sending converso 
members to morisco populations to try and help them into orthodoxy as an escape 
from the ever more racially oriented onslaught of the Spanish Inquisition. This 
attempt by converso Jesuits was an attempt to help the moriscos self-colonize, 
that is, to make themselves sufficiently Catholic, and thus sufficiently Spanish, to 
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be accepted as Spanish in society—this attempt was ultimately without success.111 
This experience heavily informed converso Jesuit activity in Colonial Latin 
America. 
Before turning to early Jesuit converso anticolonialism in Colonial Latin 
America, it is worth noting that anticolonial conversos activity had already been 
present there before the arrival of converso Jesuits. The best known exemplar of 
such activity was that of Bartolomé de las Casas. Las Casas, of converso 
background on his father’s side, entered the Dominican order roughly two 
decades before the founding of the Jesuit order.112 Bartolomé de las Casas’ 
defense of the indigenous population of Colonial Latin America shows the same 
continuity with the pureza de sangre discourse later seen from converso Jesuits.  
This is clear from his disputation with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda over indigenous 
rights in 1550. Las Casas makes a special point of the assertion that the natives 
are not by nature unsuitable for Christianity, and that substantial moderation of 
the Spanish Inquisition is appropriate for natives newly converted to the faith—
that it should be corrective rather that direly punitive.113 Las Casas also argued 
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against the racial conflation of indigenous peoples and Jews, specifically in the 
capacity that natives did not possess an inherent incapacity for genuine 
conversion.114  
 In turning to early Jesuit converso activity in Colonial Latin America, it 
is important to reiterate that the Postcolonial Studies framework has taken the 
Jesuit order as a discrete unit and monolithic agent of empire, leaving the 
converso experience of many early Jesuits out of scholarly analysis. Factoring 
this experience back into such analysis offers a different, and often opposite, 
perspective. One such example is the activities of the converso Jesuit José de 
Anchieta in colonial Brazil. Scholars Paulo Edson Alves Filho and John Milton 
insist that José de Anchieta’s massive production of religious texts translated 
into the native Tupi language was merely a tool to facilitate colonial 
domination.115 The authors refer generally to Anchieta’s adaptations of native 
religious and cultural elements in ways that made them more compatible with 
Catholicism as a cynical method of reinforcing colonial domination.116  
 Anne B. McGinness discusses the contradiction between Anchieta’s 
support of both imperial subjugation and cultural accommodation toward the 
native population of Brazil. She characterizes this contradiction merely as Jesuit 
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expediency in the mission to save heathen souls.117 While the latter-day position 
of the Jesuit order did adopt a hardened racial stance against the natives, this 
was not until after the pureza de sangre restrictions had driven conversos from 
the order. Analyses such as those above do not account for the fact that for the 
first half-century of the order, converso Jesuits were both active in Colonial 
Latin America and themselves increasingly victims of the same forces that were 
being brought to bear on the native populations. 
 Converso Jesuits were keenly aware that the only possible emancipation 
within a society under Spanish or Portuguese power was through Catholicism. 
More than that, conversos such as José de Anchieta were aware through their 
own experiences that any possibility for such emancipation depended on two 
key things: 1) a deracialization of the natives in the eyes of colonial power—
especially away from a conflation with Jewishness that would have threatened 
converso and natives alike; and 2) a perception of sufficient Catholic orthodoxy 
among the native population in the eyes of colonial power. It was the distinct 
lack of success on both of these counts that allowed the pureza de sangre 
discourse to become codified and destroy the position of conversos in society—
and was, by the time of Anchieta’s work in Brazil, seriously threatening their 
status in the order as well.  
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 In this context, the writings of José de Anchieta become clearly 
anticolonial, in an emancipatory capacity, as an attempt to resolve and bring the 
pureza de sangre discourse over the Tupi to an end. Anchieta’s adaptation of 
native concepts and terminologies through his translations of religious material 
into Tupi was intended to facilitate the appearance of Catholic orthodoxy as 
quickly as possible, as had been attempted with moriscos, to get the natives clear 
of the dangers that conversos had come to dread themselves. In the same 
fashion, McGinness misidentifies Anchieta’s work as supporting subjugation. 
Conversos were well aware that subjugation and coercion into Christianity was 
unavoidable, having experienced it themselves within living memory. 
Anchieta’s work conveyed well-informed warnings about the futility of 
resistance and of a dire need to conform to Catholic orthodoxy with all possible 
haste.118 José de Anchieta’s work was as much about saving native lives as it 
was saving native souls. This thread of emancipatory anticolonialism is even 
more pronounced in the work of José de Acosta and other converso Jesuits in 
Peru. 
 Like his converso contemporaries in Brazil, José de Acosta has been 
framed by the Postcolonial Studies outlook as merely an appendage of the 
Spanish and Portuguese empires in a manner which has caused analytical 
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confusion. Gregory J. Shepherd’s studies of de Acosta’s Historia Natural y 
Moral de las Indias and De Procuranda Indorum Salute stand as particular 
examples. On the one hand, Shepherd claims that de Acosta is a tool of 
colonialism.119 Elsewhere, de Acosta is put forward as its opponent.120 Shepherd 
tends to essentialize de Acosta and his work, approaching them from a 
macroscopic, if not ahistorical, temporal frame.121 In doing so, Shepherd shoves 
disparate elements, such as Spanishness and Jesuit uniformity, together in 
attempts to designate cohesive objects.122 Shepherd’s very brief biographical 
sketch of de Acosta fails to account for, or even mention, his converso 
background or the pureza de sangre discourse within the Society in which de 
Acosta was embroiled.123 Shepherd is unable to offer any contextualization for 
de Acosta’s “objectives to create and promote a ‘Christianizeable’ standing for 
Amerindians.”124  
 A reading of Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias makes it abundantly 
clear that the context Shepherd lacks is de Acosta’s converso background and 
his involvement in the pureza de sangre discourse, which is reflected strongly in 
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the contours of de Acosta’s argumentation in Historia Natural y Moral de las 
Indias. He does the work of unequivocally disassociating the natives from any 
ancestral connection to the Jews by elaborating on their lack of any common 
traits.125 De Acosta takes this further, calling out the general absurdity of the 
idea that the natives descended from the Lost Tribes of Israel, which enjoyed 
great popularity at this time: “…I do not see how the apocryphal Euphrates of 
Esdras could have provided a better opportunity for men to cross to the New 
World than Plato’s enchanted and fabled Atlantis.”126 
 De Acosta explicitly writes his history against the notion that there are 
racial traits rendering natives unsuitable for Catholicism, to “…refute the false 
opinion that is commonly held about them, that they are brutes and bestial folk 
and lack in understanding or with so little that it scarcely merits the name.”127 
He derides such opinions as a “common and harmful delusion,” of “the most 
ignorant and presumptuous of men.”128 De Acosta insists that the native peoples 
of Colonial Latin America possess a capacity for Catholicism and learning on 
par with or superior to any Spaniard, and castigates the Spanish for their 
outrages against the natives at great length.129  He then carries on to demonstrate 
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natural native merit by elaborating on their extensive history of cultural 
accomplishments for another twenty-seven chapters.130 
 Another work, De Procuranda Indorum Salute, reflects de Acosta’s 
involvement with the pureza de sangre discourse in his defense of allowing 
mestizos (those of mixed Spanish and native descent) into the Jesuit order. In 
making his defense, he attacks the verbiage of Grand Inquisitor Silíceo, whose 
argumentation (discussed above) relied heavily on the concept of custom as a 
function of race.131 De Acosta employs a modified version of Silíceo’s metaphor 
of mother’s milk to invert the latter’s argument, asserting instead that custom is 
not racial—rather, it is learned as a function of culture from “having suckled 
Indian milk and being raised among Indians.”132 This shift away from Silíceo’s 
contention that custom is transmitted literally through mother’s milk to de 
Acosta’s assertion that custom is a function of environment has been overlooked 
by scholars working with a Postcolonial Studies framework and unfamiliar with 
de Acosta’s converso background and his efforts against the racial element 
central to the pureza de sangre discourse. One ironic example is Sabine Hyland, 
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who, through this oversight, places blame for the racism of Colonial Peru 
specifically on the shoulders of José de Acosta.133 
Such oversight is even more apparent when taken in the context of 
converso Jesuit activity in Colonial Peru at large. The number of these converso 
Jesuits was exceptionally high as a result of Mercurian’s exile of them from 
Europe in 1573. More relevant even than this is that these were the same 
converso Jesuits who had previously been deployed in the ultimately futile 
attempt to save moriscos from the Spanish Inquisition.134 Through this 
experience, these Jesuits were uniquely aware of the existential threat posed to 
native Peruvians by Spanish racism—especially in light of the fact that native 
protections from the Spanish Inquisition were starting to weaken.135 De Acosta 
worked with this group of converso Jesuits in combating, as much as possible, 
emergent racism against native Peruvians within colonial society. This included 
their approach to education, which steadfastly maintained racially mixed 
classrooms even as it began to draw increasing ire from the viceroyalty’s 
authorities.136 These effort enjoyed only limited success and came to an abrupt 
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end, as conversos were themselves ejected from the Jesuit order and replaced by 
far more racist men. 
 We see Homi K. Bhabha’s paradigms of mimicry at work here. Bhabha, 
in The Location of Culture, describes colonial mimicry as a desire by the 
colonizer to produce a “reformed” colonial subject.137 This desire is integral to 
Western Colonialism and Imperialism—to claim and convert populations as part 
of the overall contest with Islamic power. Bhabha notes that, despite this desire, 
the creation of a colonial subject so similar yet different from the colonizer 
causes ambivalence from the colonizer which disrupts society—this can clearly 
be seen in the case of the conversos—as they grew more indistinguishable from 
majority Catholic society, the pureza de sangre discourse and the Spanish 
Inquisition became increasingly Manichean and murderous in outlook.138  
 While Bhabha’s concept of mimicry only considered the colonizer’s 
intent, it is vital to understand that there is such a thing as anticolonial mimicry 
as well. Anticolonial mimicry is characterized by the colonized population 
attempting to accommodate the colonizer’s desire for a “reformed” colonial 
subject as a means to gain emancipation and decolonization into society. We see 
this anticolonial mimicry in action first in the converso surges of Jews 
attempting to gain emancipation (and retain residency) in Spain, and later in the 
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instances of converso Jesuit attempts to intercede and aid both moriscos and 
natives in becoming unobtrusive enough to gain entry into society.  
 This anticolonial mimicry, self-colonization as a means toward the end 
of emancipation into majority society, has remained a hallmark of European 
Jewish anticolonialism—including the German Jewish variant discussed below. 
In addition to anticolonial mimicry, the attempt to deracialize Jewishness within 
the cultural discourse of society has also remained key. A discussion of the 
colonial history of German Jews quickly reveals that what we saw in Spain as 
the pureza de sangre discourse is replicated in German culture as the discourse 
on Jewish emancipation. 
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PART II: A Colonial History of German Jewry 
The colonization of German Jewry has its origins in Latin Christian 
Europe’s policies toward Jews. Church policy toward the Jews was imbued with 
a tension between the impulse to forcibly convert Jews into Catholic society and 
the impulse to shackle them as an enslaved minority in “perpetual servitude” for 
their collective guilt of deicide.139 The general characterization of Jews as 
tainted within Christianity led to their being forced into vocations that were 
considered unclean and, especially, un-Christian—such as moneylending, 
merchant activities, and other occupations deemed offensive to Christian 
sensibilities.140 This developed into a situation where Jews in German lands and 
the rest of Latin Europe were allowed residence by authorities based on their 
economic utility to the community, and were legally allowed to remain only so 
long as this utility continued.141 The situation of the Jews in German lands 
deteriorated into the early modern period, especially as the Jewish ethnic 
difference became ever more visible as Christianity homogenized Europe.142  
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The Colonization of German Jewry 
During the cataclysm of the sixteenth century, which included a 
resurgence of the Black Death as well as the disintegration of Christendom 
brought on by the Protestant Reformation and resultant religious warfare, 
European Jewry was subjected to intense violence at the hands of Christians.143 
This hostile environment drove Jews to flee Central Europe into Polish and 
Slavic areas.144 Between the end of the sixteenth century and the onset of the 
Thirty Years’ War in 1618, rulers within the German states began to import 
Jews back into their realms in order to exploit the vast financial network 
developed by Jews during centuries of occupational marginalization—allowing 
German states to gain a source of independent wealth.145   
German Jewish Communities as Colonies 
During the Thirty Years’ War, rulers increasingly exploited their 
imported Jews as a means to finance their military campaigns. By the mid-
seventeenth century, the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War exhausted 
Protestant-Catholic violence and financially ruined the German states of the 
fragmented Holy Roman Empire.146 With the rise of mercantilism and of 
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absolutist states following the Peace of Westphalia, the politics of power in 
Europe became one of economic warfare. In response to this, German rulers 
formalized the status of Jewish populations into their realms by designating 
them as royal chattel—these populations were ghettoized and held for ransom 
against their ability to produce endless amounts of liquid wealth.147  This was 
framed as royal protection. German Jewish communities would be subject to 
expulsion into the midst of an increasingly hostile Christian population if they 
failed to meet the constant financial demands of their royal owners.148  
In reformulating the status of Jewish communities into ghettoized 
colonies, the older medieval structure of Jewish communities in German lands 
was modified to treat these communities as a corporate unit under royal 
ownership.149 While the particulars of this arrangement were as numerous as the 
various potentates themselves, more generally, they resembled a blending of 
administrative units found in the British Empire, namely crown colonies and the 
Princely States under the British Raj. The German ruler owned the community 
as a possession, which was internally administered and taxed by a (mostly) 
autonomous Jewish authority structure—which, depending on the community in 
question, may have included a Landrabbiner and/or a Court Jew interfacing with 
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royal authority and acting as a representative, or shtadlan, interceding on behalf 
of the colonized Jewish community.150 
 This typified the experience of German Jewry during the Age of 
Mercantilism into the latter half of the eighteenth century, where entire Jewish 
communities were ejected for failure to come up with demanded funds.151 As 
mercantilism began to decline, the growing Enlightenment changed the 
economics and politics of German lands. During this transition, German Jewish 
anticolonialism manifested during the struggle for emancipation. It is 
appropriate to view this process as one of attempted decolonization, not only 
because the ghettos exhibited the hallmarks of colonialism—a captive, subject 
population exploited for its resources and labor—but because the ghettos were 
actually referred to as colonies within the emancipation discourse.152 This in 
itself highlights the inappropriateness of the Postcolonial Studies framework’s 
tendency to view the German Jewish experience as “proto-colonial.” By the time 
of the emancipation discourse, German Jews had already been thoroughly 
colonized for more than a century. 
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German Jewish Anticolonialism 
 German Jewish anticolonialism proceeded in roughly two phases, each 
of them responding to changes within the culture of their German colonizers—
invoking the ideals therein in the effort to bring about the decolonization of 
German Jewry. The first phase reformulated the German Enlightenment as a 
means to secure Jewish emancipation, while the second reflected the German 
shift to Romanticism. Notably, both of these phases were characterized with an 
initial rejection of German antisemitic premises, followed by capitulation and 
anticolonial mimicry—with debate over the question of to what extent 
Jewishness needed to be mitigated to facilitate the emancipation of Jews fully 
into German society.  
Moses Mendelssohn and the Capitulation of the Haskalah 
 Moses Mendelssohn was one of the founding figures of the Haskalah, or 
“Jewish Enlightenment.” The Haskalah began as an intellectual and social 
movement amongst German Jews seeking to revitalize Jewish life within its 
communities, combining elements of the German Enlightenment with a 
nostalgic view of the cultural vitality of Jews in Muslim Spain.153 Mendelssohn 
and other early figures of the Haskalah, known as maskilim, operated on a logic 
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that the German Enlightenment’s rationalism had created an emergent secular 
space within German culture which could allow for an integration of German 
Jews into German society without abandoning their Jewish identity.154  
 Mendelssohn occupied a central place in the advent of the debate over 
the emancipation of German Jewry, which began in Prussia in 1781. His 
German friend, the historian and political writer Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, 
was asked by Mendelssohn to produce an argument in favor of Jewish 
emancipation. The result was a pamphlet titled Concerning the Amelioration of 
the Civil Status of the Jews. Therein, Dohm argues that Jews should be granted 
equal rights under the law.155 However, Dohm also contends that the colonized 
state of German Jews has caused in them a degenerate Jewishness that must first 
be expunged in order for them to be decolonized and emancipated into German 
society.156 Further, German Jews should be compelled to do this by the 
government: 
This would have to be done either in Jewish schools, or if teachers and 
funds are for the time being lacking, the Jews should be permitted to 
send their children to the Christian schools (except for the hours reserved 
for religious instruction). As some Jews perhaps would be kept from 
making use of this permission by prejudice, they should even be required 
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to send their children to certain classes in accordance with their future 
vocations.157 
Already in the opening document of the German Jewish emancipation discourse, 
its antisemitic premise of coding Jewishness as negative is clear. Moreover, in 
the opponents of emancipation, those same elements that we identified within 
the pureza de sangre discourse as the core of antisemitism manifest themselves 
immediately. 
 The famous biblical scholar Johann David Michaelis opposed 
emancipation in his Arguments against Dohm. Michaelis contends that in 
addition to the risk Jewish emancipation posed as disruptive to German civil 
society, it is in fact impossible to emancipate Jews into German society.158 This 
is due to an innately disloyal nature tied inextricably to their Jewishness: 
But it will be impossible to consider the Jew as an equal of our citizens, 
and it is therefore impossible to grant him the same freedoms. For he will 
never be a full citizen with respect for and pride in his country […] and 
he will never be fully reliable in an hour of danger […] The Jews will 
always see the state as a temporary home, which they will leave in the 
hour of their greatest happiness to return to Palestine.159 
Michaelis elaborates that this innate disloyalty is why the Egyptians enslaved 
the biblical Hebrews, and adds that the racial inferiority of Jews also makes 
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them physically incapable of that basic component of citizenship: military 
service.160  
 Before discussing Mendelssohn’s reaction to this exchange, it is 
important to understand Michaelis’ opposition to emancipation also as an 
explicit argument against decolonization. Michaelis believed that, in addition to 
being a “southern race” incapable of emancipation, Jews would be more useful 
if they were redeployed as a colonial possession: 
Such a people can perhaps become useful to us in agriculture and 
manufacturing, if one manages them in the proper manner. They would 
become even more useful if we had sugar islands which from time to 
time could depopulate the European fatherland, sugar islands which, 
with the wealth they produce, nevertheless have an unhealthy climate.161 
This proposed creation of “sugar islands” was after the style of those possessed 
by other European empires, which imported African slaves to the West Indies in 
order to produce as much sugar crop as possible.162 This underscores the 
colonized status of German Jews in two ways.  
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 First and foremost, Michaelis’ consideration of relocating Jews to sugar 
islands rather than bothering with the Atlantic Slave Trade highlights the chattel 
status of the German Jewry. Second, it was the specific colonial problems 
German States were facing with the economic changes brought about by the 
shift away from mercantilism that allowed the emancipation discourse to arise in 
the first place. In much the same way that African American slaves could not be 
emancipated for as long as the plantation system of the Southern United States 
remained in place, the advent of the discourse on German Jewish emancipation 
had as much to do with the end of the economic system that made Jews valuable 
as a colonial possession as it did the ostensible secular space in culture 
generated by the German Enlightenment. It is important to understand that 
Michaelis’ suggestion is not an intellectual exercise in “proto-colonialism” or 
any such “colonial imaginary,” it is his solution to the problem of a colonial 
cash-crop whose mercantile soil had turned barren. 
 Returning to Moses Mendelssohn, he was deeply dissatisfied with both 
sides of the nascent emancipation debate. In his Response to Dohm, 
Mendelssohn utterly rejects the idea that Jews must be made ready for 
emancipation through government programs targeting degenerate Jewishness in 
order to be useful to society—Jews are already useful to society, and thus 
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deserve emancipation as a matter of natural rights.163 Mendelssohn also rejects 
Michaelis’ racialized conception of the intractable difference between Jews and 
Germans in his Remarks Concerning Michaelis’ Response to Dohm.164 
Mendelssohn further criticizes the considerable liberal failure inherent to the 
Christian colonial impulse, while also intimating a Jewish moral superiority 
common to anticolonial criticism, and rebuts Michaelis’ racist description of 
Jewish physical deformity with sarcasm: 
Christians have neglected the doctrines of their founders and have 
become conquerors, oppressors and slave-traders, and in this way, Jews 
too could be made fit for military service. But it is obvious that they will 
have to be the proper height, as Herr Michaelis wisely reminds us, unless 
they are merely to be used against hostile pygmies and fellow Jews.165 
This strong rebuke of the moral failings of German Christians, and by extension 
the colonial enterprise of the Christian West at large, was central to 
Mendelssohn’s appeal to the secular space that he and other early maskilim 
believed Enlightenment rationalism could and would produce.   
 This particularly informed his insistence that any major changes made 
within German Jewish culture needed to begin following emancipation, rather 
than as a condition of emancipation.166 However, the hoped for secular space did 
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not and would not manifest. Mendelssohn’s own life interacting with German 
society illustrated this particularly.  
 For example, Mendelssohn was beset by the Protestant deacon Johann 
Caspar Lavater, a famous practitioner of the pseudoscience physiognomy, which 
supposedly could divine the nature and fate of a person by examining the shape 
of one’s head. Lavater was certain that the slope of Mendelssohn’s forehead 
marked him as a latent convert to Christianity.167 Lavater also believed that the 
conversion of Mendelssohn, the “German Socrates,” would help bring about the 
mass conversion of Jewry and the Second Coming of Christ.168 He issued a 
public challenge to Mendelssohn, to either refute Christianity or convert, which 
embarrassed and angered Mendelssohn, who insisted that personal religion is 
irrelevant in civil society.169  
 Lavater was representative of liberals who favored emancipation, but 
suggested conversion to Christianity as a necessary requirement to expunge the 
Jews of their backward Jewishness; Mendelssohn responded with exasperation: 
Rulers of the earth! If it be permitted to an insignificant fellow inhabitant 
thereof to lift up his voice to you: do not trust the counselors who wish to 
mislead you by smooth worlds to so harmful an undertaking. They are 
either blind themselves, and do not see the enemy of mankind lurking in 
the ambush, or they seek to blind you. Our noblest treasure, the liberty to 
think, will be forfeited if you listen to them. For the sake of your felicity 
                                                 




and ours, a union of faiths is not tolerance; it is diametrically opposed to 
true tolerance!170 
Mendelssohn was not without his German supporters. The writer and statesman 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was chagrined at the shocking failure of 
liberalism apparent within German society’s response to Mendelssohn.171 
German satirist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg also defended Mendelssohn 
against Lavater in a satire he published, titled Timorous: The Defense of Two 
Israelites Who, Overwhelmed by Lavater’s Proofs and the Taste of Pork 
Sausages, Converted to the One True Faith.172  
 Moses Mendelssohn’s stalwart rejection of the “regeneration” of Jews 
out of their Jewishness as a precondition for emancipation was both an explicit 
anticolonial demand and a strange counterpoint to his own legal status. Moses 
Mendelssohn’s protected legal status as an individual was predicated on his 
designation by Frederick the Great as an “exceptional” non-Jewish Jew.173 
Mendelssohn’s personal efforts to illustrate the natural worthiness of German 
Jews as a group to German society resulted in the irony of that society 
recognizing him idiosyncratically as aberrantly non-aberrant. Mendelssohn was 
not even able to successfully gain legal protection for his own wife and children, 
                                                 
170 Moses Mendelssohn, “The Right to Be Different (1783),” in The Jew in the Modern World, 
2nd Ed., Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 69. 
171 Amos Elon, The Pity of it All: A Portrait of the German-Jewish Epoch, 1743-1933, (New 
York: Picador, 2002), 45. 
172 Ibid., 49. 
173 Ibid., 45. 
62 
only for himself.174 Mendelssohn’s hoped for secular space, where Jews might 
be emancipated into German society spontaneously on the merits of natural law, 
had not come into being by time of his death in 1786, or after. The capitulation 
of the Haskalah and subsequent mimicry began in short order. 
Of Mendelssohn’s six children, all but two converted to Christianity in 
an effort to gain entry into German society, and by 1799, David Friedländer, 
who succeeded Mendelssohn as the representative of Prussian Jewry, became 
desperate enough to maintain the Jewish community to suggest that Jews 
undergo nominal conversion to Lutheranism as a means of entering German 
society.175 This “dry-baptism” envisioned a sort of unitary church-synagogue in 
Berlin, notably an exact inversion of Mendelssohn’s contention that “a union of 
faiths is not tolerance”; the capitulation, now complete, was rejected by 
Germans as made in bad faith.176 From this point on, the efforts of the maskilim 
turned toward the regeneration of Jewishness as a means of emancipation that 
Mendelssohn had so opposed.177 The Haskalah was thus a reactionary and 
radical program of Enlightenment, seeking to intensively reform Jewishness in a 
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manner the German colonizer might find acceptable and deserving of 
emancipation.178  
 A genuinely secular space failed to manifest itself within majority 
German society even as legal emancipation was accomplished. This was very 
clear in the case of the Jews in Prussia, who were declared emancipated by King 
Frederick William III in 1812. Despite his declaration that the Jews “…shall 
enjoy equal civil rights and liberties with Christians,” Jews remained barred 
from any positions of leadership in the Prussian government or military.179 
Notably, prior to the unification of Germany in 1871, Prussia’s emancipation of 
its Jews was the most thorough.180 In other German states, Jews faced further 
restrictions, especially in southern German states like Bavaria, where Jews were 
denied various rights such as free trade, movement, and residence.181 
 This hobbled legal emancipation induced a wave of conversions to 
Christianity by Jews desperate for a more complete entry into majority 
society.182 Heinrich Heine was among these converts—the famous poet and 
journalist hoped that a baptismal certificate would function as an “entrance 
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ticket into European society.”183 Such hopes were overwrought, as the decline of 
Enlightenment rationalism and a wave of riots would illustrate the true dearth of 
a secular space in German society, as well as inspire the second phase in 
German Jewish anticolonialism.   
Saul Ascher and the Capitulation of the Wissenschaft Des Judentums 
 During the nineteenth century, Romanticism began to displace the 
Enlightenment’s dominant place in the culture of German society. 
Romanticism’s sentimental focus and nostalgia for the medieval period as a 
basis for developing an emergent sense of national Germanness introduced a 
new peril to German Jewry. Not unlike Reconquista-era Spain, German society 
began to increasingly define Germanness in terms of contra-Jewishness, with 
Jewishness representing everything negative in German society.  
 This was not simply a prima facie similarity. German nationalist writers 
such as the historian Friedrich Rühs explicitly referenced the Spanish past as 
precedent for the Jewish contamination of German culture.184 For his part, Rühs 
believed that the baptismal font was enough to wash away Jewishness and bring 
erstwhile Jews into German society as Christians.185 Other German nationalist 
writers were not so gracious. The philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte contended 
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that Jews could only be useful to German society if they were decapitated and 
had their heads replaced with German heads empty of “Jewish ideas”; otherwise, 
they should all be deported to Palestine.186  
 German Jewish journalist and publisher Saul Ascher was scathing in his 
criticism of such nationalist writers, and roundly rejected the increasingly 
popular formulation of Jewishness as contra-Germanness.187 In his 1815 
response to Rühs, Fichte, and other nationalists, Germanomania: Sketches of a 
Portrait of the Times, Ascher asserted that the Jews as Jews have been a boon to 
European society, and that to destroy that Jewish element through conversion or 
expulsion would hobble German society, which already lagged behind the rest 
of Europe.188 Notably, Ascher also contended that the very idea of an isolated 
“German” culture is deluded, suggesting instead a process of hybridity very 
similar to the one Homi K. Bhabha describes between colonizers and 
colonized.189 The uncompromising position on the value of Jewishness as it was, 
and the explicit anticolonial demand of Ascher, would not withstand the 
intensification of German nationalism, even among Ascher’s own family. Not 
unlike the case of Moses Mendelssohn before him, Saul Ascher’s family would 
choose conversion and assimilation away from their Jewish identity as means of 
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entry into German society, ultimately entering into the German aristocracy.190 
Within four years of Ascher’s Germanomania, widespread violence would 
induce a group of Jewish intellectuals to capitulate to the nationalist turn of 
German Romanticism, and engage in a fresh form of anticolonial mimicry.  
 In August of 1819, the city of Würzburg in Bavaria rioted against Jewish 
civil rights while screaming “Hep! Hep! Death to all Jews!”191 Before ending in 
October, anti-Jewish rioting spread and terrorized cities throughout the central 
and southwestern German states.192 The “Hep! Hep! Riots” were a clear 
indication that German Jewish anticolonial appeals to Enlightenment rationalism 
were insufficient, in the face of intensifying German Romantic nationalism, as a 
path toward emancipation into German society. The maskilim had no ready 
response to these developments—up to this point the Haskalah as an intellectual 
movement had not had cause to engage with popular sentiment so directly, and 
its anticolonial argumentation was based primary upon German Jewish utility to 
the state.193 Moving forward, emphasize would shift progressively toward utility 
to German national culture. 
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 Within weeks of the riots, a new movement began to emerge out of the 
Haskalah known as the Wissenschaft des Judentums, responding to prevailing 
German Romanticism—these intellectuals adopted Saul Ascher’s valuation of 
Jewishness, but capitulated away from his stalwart position to approach German 
Jewish integration as a matter of making Jewishness appear German enough to 
no longer be perceived as a threat by German nationalists.194 A large part of 
German Romanticism’s development of a sense of German national identity 
involved academic “sciences” such as philology, philosophy, and history.195 The 
Wissenschaft des Judentums (Science of Judaism) was intended to introduce 
these elements into Jewish intellectual culture.196 Leopold Zunz, the founder of 
the movement, saw this as essential to the success of German Jewish 
emancipation: 
The neglect of Jewish science is intricately bound up with the Jews’ civic 
degradation. Through greater intellectual culture and more fundamental 
knowledge of their own affairs, the Jews would have gained not only a 
higher level of recognition, thus of rights; but many legislative blunders, 
many prejudices against Jewish antiquity, many judgements of recent 
efforts are a direct result of the neglected state in which, in the last 
seventy years in Germany, Jewish literature and culture found 
themselves.197 
The Wissenschaft des Judentums’ turn toward “scientific” self-study and self-
reform moved away from earlier anticolonial appeals to liberalism which 
                                                 





typified the Haskalah, exemplifying again Homi K. Bhabha’s paradigm of 
mimicry, but in an anticolonial mode, by attempting to self-colonize Jewishness 
in such a way that would allow German majority society to accept Jews as 
sufficiently “German” to gain entry into society: 
Its purpose was to bring ordinary Jews into the orbit of German kultur 
and at the same time reinforce Jewish identity…Wissenschaft, then, was 
to reconcile Jews and Germans.198  
This mimicry was a program of radical Romanticism in a manner very much 
like the Haskalah had been a program of radical Enlightenment—both were 
intensive and reactionary responses to hostility on the part of their German 
colonizer.  
 Anticolonial mimicry extended to changes in Jewish religious practices. 
Abraham Geiger, founder of Reform Judaism, altered Jewish religious services 
in such a way that brought them very close to that of Protestantism. Geiger’s 
move to bring Judaism closer to German Christianity, while still retaining 
Judaism’s identity as a religion, constituted anticolonial resistance to the 
diametric opposition of Jew and German within majority society.199  
 Like the Haskalah it arose from, the Wissenschaft des Judentums was 
unsuccessful in gaining German Jewry full entry into German society. Even 
                                                 
198 Elon, Pity of it All, 112. 
199 Susannah Heschel, “Revolt of the Colonized: Abraham Geiger’s Wissenschaft des Judentums 
as a Challenge to Christian Hegemony in the Academy,” New German Critique 77 (1999): 61-
85, 67. 
69 
following the ultimate consolidation of the German “inner-empire” with the 
unification of the German Reich in 1871, and the legal emancipation of all 
German Jews, entry into society remained unsuccessful.200 The more German 
Jewry endeavored to bring itself into line with German national mores and 
culture, the more German society disdained them—again falling within Homi K. 
Bhabha’s paradigm of colonizer ambivalence.201 By 1879, the general 
conception of Germanness defined in terms of contra-Jewishness was such a 
central aspect of German national identity that the German publicist Wilhelm 
Marr formulated it into its own discrete term, “antisemitism,” and founded the 
League of Antisemites.  
 It must be remembered that antisemitism had already been operative in 
Germany and Europe at large for centuries, as the earlier discussion of early 
modern Spain clearly illustrates. All he did was provide an innovation of 
terminology. Notably, even Marr was known to exhibit tendencies that would be 
identified as philosemitic as it is currently misidentified in some scholarship—
he was as willing to accept individual Jews who had entirely shed their 
Jewishness as the Dreyfusards would be a few decades later.202  
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 The intensification of German antisemitism, and the failure of the 
Wissenschaft des Judentums to ameliorate it, as well as the deterioration of the 
situation of European Jewry at large, began to stir a nationalistic anticolonial 
response among German Jews leading into the twentieth century. Before turning 
to the development of Zionism out of this response, it is necessary to give 
attention to German Jewish perception of the Islamic world, and its relationship 
with the Ostjuden. 
German Jewry and the Matter of Orientalism 
 The relationship between German Jewish anticolonialism and the 
“Orient” has left itself open to criticism from both the Postcolonial Studies 
framework and from other scholars seeking to facilitate a final resolution to the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict.203 This has taken the form of ascribing orientalism to 
German Jews, especially in their highly ambivalent responses to and interactions 
with the Ostjuden.  
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Postcolonial Studies Scholarship on German Jews 
 Postcolonial Studies scholarship on German Jews follows after Suzanne 
Zantop’s 1997 monograph Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in 
Pre-colonial Germany, 1770-1870. Therein, Zantop attributes to Germans an 
envy of the possessions of the major Western colonial powers—leading to a 
“colonial fantasy” in which the German nation engaged in a “rehearsal” for its 
subsequent late nineteenth century territorial expansion.204  Within this imagined 
rehearsal, the German nation defined its relations with outsiders of its would-be 
subject populations as an extension of the already extant relationship between 
Germans and “internal others,” such as the Jews, thus colonizing these groups 
internally in preparation for the German nation’s forthcoming colonial 
enterprise.205 Notably, for being a work on the internal colonization of German 
lands, Zantop’s work includes scant mention of Germany Jewry, and only then 
in reference to all “internal others” as a conglomeration.206 Despite this, her 
book informed subsequent Postcolonial Studies scholarship on German Jewry.  
 Susannah Heschel expands on Zantop’s idea of “rehearsal” in a 1999 
article dealing with Abraham Geiger and the Wissenschaft des Judentums as a 
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site of colonial revolt, framing debates surrounding Jewish emancipation in 
Germany as a “proto-colonial enterprise.”207 Heschel utilizes Homi K. Bhabha’s 
framework of complex interrelation between the colonized and the colonizer to 
view Abraham Geiger’s use of a Protestant theological framework as a 
subversion of German “proto-colonialism” to create new space for German Jews 
as cultural insiders.208  
 Jonathan M. Hess’s 2000 article, noted in the Introduction, focuses on 
Johann David Michaelis and expands upon Edward Said’s concept of 
orientalism by pairing it with modern antisemitism as “mutually determining 
discourses,” particularly Michaelis’ view that the Jews were of a “southern race” 
which could not possibly be integrated into the German populace.209  
 While Heschel and Hess view German Jews as courageous 
anticolonialists, Leo W. Riegert, Jr. complicates this Saidian binary in his 2009 
article by exploring German Jews as both subjects and agents of empire.210 
Riegert is rightly critical of the tendency to depict German Jewish figures 
primarily as heroic figures railing against colonial oppression.211 Instead of 
subscribing to a narrow view of colonized German Jews as “countering 
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modernity’s homogenizing claims,” Riegert takes a cue from Homi K. Bhabha 
by suggesting an “interstitial approach to the contradictory ways in which Jews 
contributed to German colonialist and Orientalist fantasies” around the turn of 
the twentieth century.212 In this sense, the German Jewish capacity both as 
subjects and agents of empire is seen especially in regards to their highly 
ambivalent attitudes toward the Ostjuden, or Eastern European Jews.213 Riegert 
also borrows from Homi K. Bhabha’s concept of mimicry discourse between the 
colonizer and the colonized, which disrupts colonial stability by accentuating the 
otherness of the colonized and inspiring mockery by the colonizer. Riegert 
expands this idea to note how an internally colonized population like German 
Jewry can simultaneously direct mockery through mimicry discourse in both 
directions, toward the German colonizer and the Ostjuden outsider, through 
German Jewry’s own insider/outsider status.214 Riegert highlights this doubling 
of the mimicry discourse into dual mockery as illustrating the extreme identity 
instability of colonized German Jews.215 
 While there is much borrowing from Edward Said in this scholarship on 
German Jewry as a colonized people, there are also illuminating criticisms. For 
example, Susannah Heschel is highly critical of Said’s overall dismissal of the 
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historical importance of German orientalism.216 Similarly, Jonathan M. Hess 
confronts Said’s characterization of German orientalism as essentially 
intellectual in nature and, thus, not overly politically relevant, and is very critical 
of Said’s vague treatment of the connection between antisemitism and 
orientalism.217  
Certainly, German Jewish responses to Ostjuden can appear to be very 
similar to orientalism, and, to a limited extent, they are. However, the attribution 
of orientalism by scholars such as Riegert often does not take into account 
German Jewish engagement with the antisemitic discourse in German society 
actively arrayed against it, or, if it does, frames this discourse as orientalism as 
well. Moreover, this view also tends to look backward from the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict as a referent. A more historically contextualized look at the apparent 
relationship between German Jews and orientalism illustrates that what was 
actually occurring was an extension of the German Jewish anticolonial response 
to German society’s antisemitic discourse. Before turning to the relationship 
between German Jews and the Ostjuden, it is important to discuss the place of 
the Islamic world within German Jewish anticolonialism.  
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Muslim Spain as Role Model and Anticolonial Critique 
 Recall that early maskilim, such as Moses Mendelssohn, believed that the 
German Enlightenment had generated a secular space within German culture 
into which German Jews might be decolonized and emancipated. When this was 
not immediately forthcoming, enlarging that secular space sufficiently so that 
both Christians and Jews could live inside it became the great goal of the 
Haskalah as the surest way to facilitate emancipation. Because appeals to 
liberalism proved insufficient to convince German society that German Jews 
were worthy of emancipation, another option was needed. Other anticolonial 
movements in history, such as that of British India, invoked the nobility of the 
colonized’s cultural past as proof of worth.218 German Jewish anticolonialism 
sought to do likewise. However, the maskilim had little precedent to draw from 
in the history of German Jews, or from Jews of Latin Christian European 
environs overall, for the kind of secular space they were attempting to enlarge 
within German society to facilitate their decolonization.219 For this reason, 
maskilim turned to the historical experience of the Jews of Muslim Spain.220  
The Jews of Muslim Spain were a protected minority under Islamic 
political and religious law in a way that prevented the same kind of colonization 
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and chattelization Jews experienced in Germany.221 This difference allowed a 
secular space in the culture of Muslim Spain to exist in which Jews were able to 
participate and thrive.222 Maskilim, therefore, looked toward prominent Jewish 
figures from the history of Muslim Spain as role models for how they might 
make the most of the diminutive secular space German society had available.223 
The use of Muslim Spain as a role model persisted throughout the 
Haskalah, and was an integral element of the Wissenschaft des Judentums as 
well. German Jews perceived the period of Islamic rule in Spain as the cause of 
the flowering of Jewish culture during that period, specifically because of the 
secular space that existed within Muslim Spanish culture. The resulting 
“efflorescence” of Jewish scholarship and art resulted in an enhanced hybrid 
culture that created a Golden Age.224  
The relationship between Jewish inclusion in majority society and that 
society’s cultural well-being was considered by German Jews to be existential. 
So much so, in fact, that the expulsion of Jews at the conclusion of the 
Reconquista reduced nascent Christian Spain to a state of fanatical barbarism 
and backwardness which spilled over into the world at large.225 This particular 
                                                 
221 Cohen, Under Crescent and Cross, 52. And, for that matter, Muslim Spain did not include the 
same colonial impulse that would animate the Spanish Christians who later drove them from the 
peninsula.   
222 W. Montgomery Watt and Pierre Cachia, A History of Islamic Spain, (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Aldine Transaction, 2008), 64. 
223 Schapkow, Role Model and Countermodel, 56. 
224 Ibid., 162, 171. 
225 Ibid., 217. 
77 
vein of anticolonial criticism is visible as early as Moses Mendelssohn’s 
castigation of Christianity over the Western Colonial and Imperial enterprises, 
and notably calls all of European society to task over it.  
Importantly, this basic formulation of the laudable nature of Islamic rule 
in Spain, and the sense of tragedy at its end, dramatically undercuts any simple 
attribution of orientalism to German Jews. Far from considering Islam an 
inherent threat, this perspective was in fact an inversion of the orientalist 
perspective. Indeed, that was the point. In the face of a German culture that 
came to increasingly valorize Medieval Latin Christendom, Muslim Spain 
served as a pointed anticolonial critique: medieval Muslim Spain had been more 
vital, more liberal, and more advanced than modern Germany. As German 
Jewish anticolonialism contained within its basic premise a repudiation of 
orientalism, from its point of origin no less, this casts immediate doubt on the 
attribution of orientalism to the German Jewish response to the Ostjuden.  
German Jews and Ostjuden: A Question of Orientalism 
 Given that the viewpoint of German Jewish anticolonial intellectuals 
fails to meet the basic criteria of orientalism, an alternative explanation for their 
ambivalent perspective toward the Ostjuden is necessary. Importantly, this 
perspective was based primarily around two elements. The first was the 
relationship between the Ostjuden and Muslim Spain within the German Jewish 
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anticolonial paradigm, while the second was a reflection of the running 
antisemitic discourse within German culture. 
  As noted above, part of the paradigm of Muslim Spain within the 
German Jewish anticolonial imagination was the sense that the expulsion of 
Jews from Christian Spain destroyed its culture. Within this paradigm, the 
expulsion was seen to have led to the decay of Spanish Jewish culture as well, 
especially where Spanish Jews relocated to Europe. The general idea here is that 
the Spanish expulsion was so traumatic that it largely stopped the development 
of Spanish Jewish culture in its tracks, becoming one that looked back upon the 
days of Muslim Spain with nostalgia and regret. This ossification was felt to 
have spread to both the Jews of German lands and Eastern Europe. In drawing 
on that past as noble and restorative, German Jewish anticolonialism, first 
through the Haskalah and, later, the Wissenschaft des Judentums, sought to 
reverse that ossification and reproduce its enhanced hybrid culture in a German 
context. 
 Important here is that the differences between German Jews and Eastern 
European Jews were taken to be geographic rather than categorical, at least not 
in the same sense implied by orientalism. Indeed, both shared in an older 
common Germanic Jewish (Ashkenazic) culture. Much of this geographical 
difference was tied to the relative situation of Jews in each region at the hands 
of Christian majority society.  
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 The situation of the Ostjuden well into the modern period had been 
different from that of German Jews. Most significantly, the Ostjuden had 
enjoyed a more or less unbroken history of legal protection that dated back to 
before the full Christianization of Eastern Europe.226 This prevented the same 
manner of chattelized colonization experienced by German Jews. This also 
meant that the Ostjuden were not ghettoized in the same manner that German 
Jews had been; they lived in communities throughout Eastern Europe and plied a 
full array of trades.227  This changed dramatically during the seventeenth 
century, when Eastern Europe became the site of increasing territorial disputes 
between European empires such as Austria and Russia. Violence and oppression 
against the Ostjuden, beginning in earnest during the seventeenth century, 
remained far greater than that suffered by German Jews.228  
 As they lived spread throughout the region, the Ostjuden were 
particularly vulnerable to surges of antisemitic violence, which disrupted their 
livelihoods and left them increasingly as destitute refugees. If the Ostjuden were 
more “backward,” it was a result of these factors, rather than anything inherently 
“Oriental” about them. These tumultuous times generated cultural impulses in 
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the opposite direction as those experienced among German Jews. The great 
cultural response of the Ostjuden was toward mysticism and messianism, itself 
not at all uncommon for peoples under harsh imperial or colonial dominion—it 
is during this time that the spiritual revivalism of Hasidism took root.229 Again, 
it must be stressed that there was not a typological difference at play here. This 
is clear from the fact that throughout this period, German Jews and Ostjuden 
travelled heavily between regions for educational pursuits, depending on 
whether the education sought favored the spiritualism of the Hasidim or the 
rationalism of the Haskalah.  
 These developments in Eastern Europe which endangered the Ostjuden 
were well understood by the maskilim in German lands. Moses Mendelssohn 
was sympathetic, and offered entry into the Haskalah for Ostjuden as a sort of 
pipeline out of Eastern Europe similar to the one the early Jesuit order offered to 
conversos as a way out of Spain.230 Indeed, one of the most brilliant figures of 
the era, Solomon Maimon, was among the Ostjuden who entered into the circle 
of maskilim in just this fashion.231 For his own part, Maimon is of particular 
note. 
 Born Shlomo Ben Joshua in Polish Lithuania, Maimon was an autodidact 
and Talmudic prodigy who left his home in a search for learning which brought 
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him to Berlin.232 Shlomo Ben Joshua became “Solomon Maimon” as a self-
reference of his own symbolic return to the intellectual flowering of Muslim 
Spain, personified by Maimonides, whose work Maimon helped to adapt to 
serve the needs of the maskilim’s anticolonial endeavor.233 For his part, 
Maimon’s perspective of his fellow Ostjuden was similar to German Jewish 
maskilim, he felt that the Haskalah was better equipped to cope with the changes 
the Ostjuden were facing, and, in effect, Maimon’s own autobiography 
continued to inform German Jewish anticolonialism regarding the Ostjuden 
through its Wissenschaft phase.234  
 It is clear that a charge of orientalism on the part of German Jews against 
the Ostjuden lacks the kind of basic typological categorization that orientalism 
requires (leaving aside that the Ostjuden were not an Islamic group, which could 
serve as a summary disqualifier). Be that as it may, while figures such as 
Mendelssohn were sympathetic to the Ostjuden, and were content to invite them 
into the Haskalah, German Jews overall remained more ambivalent, and 
sometimes even hostile, toward the Ostjuden. This begs the question of why. 
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German Jewish Emancipation and the Ostjuden Refugee Crisis 
 As the situation of the Ostjuden continued to deteriorate, greater and 
greater numbers began to arrive in Germany as refugees—around fifty-thousand 
arrived during the 1870s alone.235 However, this was nothing compared to what 
came next. Beginning in 1881, a wave of pogroms caused a flood of Ostjuden to 
flee their homes in spectacular numbers. No less than two and one-half million 
Ostjuden had poured out of Eastern Europe by 1914, with tens of thousands 
arriving in Germany annually.236  
 This caused an unexpected crisis for German Jews. In the midst of their 
increasingly beleaguered attempt to diffuse the growing hostility of the 
antisemitic emancipation discourse within German culture, masses of 
impoverished Ostjuden suddenly began to arrive and draw the attention of 
German majority society. German opponents of German Jewish emancipation 
seized on this immediately, and the government reacted with intense negativity 
to the sudden presence of Jews who appeared to personify the oldest of 
antisemitic stereotypes. This imperiled German Jews and Ostjuden alike. It is 
vital to understand German Jewish responses to the Ostjuden within this context.  
 Further, it is important to reiterate that cultural and intellectual 
exchanges had been going on between German Jews and the Ostjuden, in both 
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directions, for some time. Indeed, there was so much exchange both in culture 
and bloodlines that it is more accurate to consider German Jews and Ostjuden as 
a hybrid culture, which of course it was—Ashkenazic culture—comprising both 
elements together, rather than Riegert’s attribution of an orientalist and colonial 
German Jewish outlook.237 However, this is not to say that there were not 
intensely negative responses to the Ostjuden on the part of German Jews, 
especially intellectuals of the Haskalah and Wissenschaft des Judentums. There 
very much were. Often, German Jewish writers resorted to the very antisemitic 
tropes German Jews themselves were consistently unable to escape from.238 This 
was an effort to distance themselves from association with these tropes. In order 
to avoid a simplistic attribution of German Jewish orientalism against Ostjuden 
victims, it is vital to understand that some of the harshest responses to the 
Ostjuden refugee crisis were from Ostjuden themselves.  
 A particular example of this is seen from the Wissenschaft historian 
Heinrich Graetz. Graetz was born in Poland, and the trajectory of his life was 
not unlike that of Solomon Maimon before him. Early in life, Graetz received a 
religious education in Wolstyn while also teaching himself both French and 
Latin.239 Following a period of study under the innovator of modern German 
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Orthodox Judaism in Oldenburg, Samson Raphael Hirsch, Graetz ultimately 
made his way into Berlin and the Wissenschaft circle as a historian.240 Though a 
Polish Jew himself, Graetz’ assessment of the Ostjuden, and Polish Jews in 
particular, was intensely negative. He went so far as to transpose antisemitic 
tropes almost wholesale onto the Ostjuden:  
People joked about the "Polacks," but nevertheless became subordinate 
to them. […] Through their influence, scientific knowledge and the study 
of the Bible declined still more than previously. In the century of 
Descartes and Spinoza […] Jewish-Polish emigrants, baited by 
Chmielnicki's bands, brought a new middle age over European 
Judaism[.]241 
Notably, Graetz transposes antisemitic tropes onto the Ostjuden of the past, 
making them responsible for the Jewishness that German majority society so 
disdains, rather than contemporary German Jews or even the fellow Ostjuden 
toward whom Graetz was so ambivalent. Two elements here are essential. First 
we see, again, the anticolonial trope of attempting to divert the colonizers’ 
racialized perception temporally away from its target. In the same way that early 
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modern moriscos were not responsible for the Islamic invasion of Spain, 
nineteenth century Jews were not responsible for the presence of the Jewishness 
that Germans so hated. Second, this highlights the tendency of German Jews and 
even other Ostjuden such as Graetz to see the refugee crisis as conjuring a sort 
of specter from the past which threatened to endanger their efforts to accomplish 
a full social emancipation of Jews within society, and from which they needed to 
distance themselves.242  
 Similarly to the way that it had been dangerous for both converso Jesuits 
and natives in Colonial Latin America to be racially conflated with Jewishness 
in Spanish society, so too was it dangerous for both German Jews and Ostjuden 
within German society. While responses to the Ostjuden could be callous and 
cruel, they were not orientalist. German Jews did not look at the Ostjuden and 
see an “other,” they saw themselves. This is immediately clear from the fact that 
Ostjuden such as Heinrich Graetz were prominent members of the Wissenschaft 
milieu—it encompassed the broader hybrid Ashkenazic culture. Moreover, a 
simple attribution of orientalism to German Jews fails to account for the harsh 
invective with which German Jews often dealt with each other. 
 The mimicry aspect of German Jewish anticolonialism is essential to 
understanding this dynamic in its broader scope. Considerations of what could 
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jeopardize emancipation were not limited to fears about the impact of the 
Ostjuden refugee crisis. Recall that the fundamentally antisemitic basis of the 
emancipation discourse meant, especially in the Wissenschaft phase, that 
convincing Germans that Jews could dispense with sufficient Jewishness was 
key to any successful social emancipation. Jews had to become Germans. Not 
unlike any intellectual movement, or anticolonial movement for that matter, 
there was not a universal consensus of how to go about this process. 
Disagreements became heated, even nasty. It is within these debates amongst 
German Jews about how best to engage with German society in the 
emancipation discourse that accusations of “Jewish self-hatred” began to be cast 
between different camps within German Jewish intellectual circles.243 
 Succinctly, “Jewish self-hatred” is characterized by the internalization of 
antisemitic tropes on the part of Jews. The irony of such accusations is readily 
apparent. Given that the emancipation discourse was fundamentally antisemitic 
in nature, the very capitulation and engagement with that discourse by German 
Jewish anticolonialists required a level of internalization in order for its praxis 
of anticolonial mimicry to function. In a particular way, accusations of “Jewish 
self-hatred” functioned as a reflection of the emancipation discourse. For 
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example, as a Polish Jew himself, Heinrich Graetz’ expressed disdain for 
Ostjuden, the Jews of the land of his own birth, might qualify him for the label 
of “Jewish self-hatred.” Yet, such attribution would be ridiculous. Rather, 
accusations of “Jewish self-hatred” served as a language of strongest terms 
through which Jewish disagreed about the proper level of anticolonial mimicry. 
In the case of Graetz and other Wissenschaft intellectuals, we now have a better 
context for the ambivalent response to Ostjuden refugees. It was a perception of 
the risk to Jewish emancipation, caused by the Ostjuden refugees’ apparent utter 
lack of anticolonial mimicry that animated this ambivalence—not orientalism. 
 Zionism represented a shift within German Jewish anticolonial mimicry 
away from self-colonization into German nationalism and toward an explicitly 
Jewish nationalism. This new phase, drawing heavily from previous phases, 
nevertheless reflected a growing sense that emancipation was an untenable 
option for decolonizing German Jews.244 This began slowly over the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. Notably, this shift was not only a German Jewish 
phenomenon, and, in fact, spanned the hybrid culture of German Jews and 
Ostjuden, represented by figures as diverse as the assimilated Spinozist Moses 
Hess from Bonn and the Orthodox Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer from Lesno.245 
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Both figures, later identified as Proto-Zionists, arrived at a common conclusion 
from opposite secular and religious camps: emancipation was a failure and Jews 
must help themselves by forming a nation in Palestine.  
Zionism as an Anticolonial Nationalist Turn 
As some German Jewish anticolonialists began to gain an understanding 
of the futility of the emancipatory paradigm of decolonization, their Jewish 
consciousness began also to extend beyond a consideration of German Jews in 
Germany. These figures had, of course, been aware of Jews elsewhere—as has 
clearly been demonstrated in the case of the Ostjuden. However, in the case of 
French Jews, for example, German Jewish anticolonialists looked toward France 
in an aspirational manner—France was seen to be as exemplar of the modern 
possibilities of emancipation not unlike the way the Jews of the Muslim Spanish 
past were seen as role models for German Jews. This offers some understanding 
as to why it was an outburst of French antisemitism, rather than the situation of 
Germany, that so impacted Theodor Herzl—the father of German Jewish 
Political Zionism.246 
                                                 
246 Elon, Pity of it All, 285; See also Jacques Kornberg, Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to 
Zionism (Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 1993). 
89 
The Dreyfus Affair: Herzl’s Loss of Faith in Emancipation  
Theodor Herzl, born to a secular family and raised in the German Jewish 
intellectual milieu of Budapest, was a newspaper correspondent in Paris when 
the Dreyfus Affair began in 1894. During the course of the Affair, the French 
Government falsely accused Jewish officer Alfred Dreyfus of espionage, 
convicted him of treason, and confined him to Devil’s Island. In 1896, Georges 
Picquart discovered that another officer, Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy, had 
framed Dreyfus to cover his own acts of espionage.  
The military attempted to suppress the matter; Esterhazy was acquitted 
and quickly fled the country. When supporters of Dreyfus accused the military 
of conspiracy and antisemitism against Dreyfus, French nationalists responded 
with antisemitic riots in cities across France.247 Like the riots that in 1819 had 
spurred the formation of the Wissenschaft des Judentums, the French riots 
resonated with shouts of “Death to Jews!”248 As witness to such rioting in a 
French culture where emancipation was thought to be more successful than in 
German culture, Herzl was deeply troubled by the antisemitism that the Affair 
showed to exist immediately under the surface of ostensibly liberal French 
culture.249 Herzl did not remain in France throughout the course of the Affair. 
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He was not present to witness the disdain toward Jews exhibited even by 
Dreyfus’s French defenders, and, having died in 1904, Herzl did not live to see 
the Dreyfusards turn on Dreyfus with antisemitic vitriol after the Affair’s 
conclusion. For Herzl, the very fact of the Affair and the rioting of 1895 were 
enough to shake his faith in emancipation. 
Herzl began to embrace the idea of Jewish nationalism as an alternative 
to emancipation; by 1896, this transition was complete with the publication of 
the pamphlet Der Judenstaat.250 Herzl had come to see the process of 
emancipation itself as a cause of antisemitism—increasingly ardent attempts by 
Jews to embrace Gentile ways could only produce ever greater antisemitic 
responses.251 Notably, this is the very definition of Homi K. Bhabha’s paradigm 
of colonial mimicry.252 For Herzl, only the establishment of a Jewish national 
home could end this feedback loop—he believed that Jewish nationalism could 
actually resolve and bring an end to antisemitism.253  
Unlike other anticolonial nationalisms, Jews did not occupy a homeland 
from which to eject its colonizers. To this end, Theodor Herzl developed a novel 
approach to the opposing sides of the antisemitic emancipation discourse, by 
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simultaneously acceding to both through a program of self-expulsion and self-
colonization.254 
Herzl Rejects Capitulation: Jewishness as Anticolonialism 
It is useful to view the formulation of Herzl’s Zionism as a rejection of 
the capitulations of the maskilim and Wissenschaft scholars who came before 
him. It was also an ultimate rejection of the emancipation discourse created by 
such capitulation: Jewishness did and would always cause antisemitism so long 
as Jews lacked their own national home; emancipation and assimilation, no 
matter how total, would change this. In doing so, Herzl managed to invert 
previous German Jewish anticolonial critiques on the benefits of Jewishness to 
European culture (via the example of Muslim Spain), to make Jewishness itself 
an anticolonial critique of Europe.  
 This manifested itself in classic anticolonial nationalist form, wherein the 
colonizer is depicted as morally bankrupt, and only the moral superiority of the 
colonized people was capable of truly realizing the colonizer’s expressed 
ideals.255 In the formulation of anticolonial nationalism, the cultural core of the 
colonized population itself becomes the ultimate anticolonial critique, and one 
that empowers the colonized people to break away as its own nation. The idea of 
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Jewishness as anticolonial critique is especially evident in Herzl’s utopian novel 
Altneuland (Old-New Land).  
 Within this novel, Herzl’s vision of a Jewish polity in Palestine is replete 
with criticisms of the failure of European liberalism, such as the absence of 
universal suffrage, which remained the norm in Europe.256 In addition to these 
criticisms, there is a strong assertion that the moral superiority of Jewish 
anticolonialism is uniquely equipped to bring the stagnated progress of 
European liberalism to its completion: 
And you know, man, who could show the way? You! You Jews! Just 
because you’re so badly off. You’ve nothing to lose. You could make the 
experimental land for humanity. […] On that ancient soil, Old-New-
Land!257 
Notably, Herzl viewed this national redemption of Jews out from under the 
antisemitic European yoke as akin to the breaking of a levy. In the wake of such 
an advent, Herzl imagined that the troubled progress that had plagued Europe 
since the Enlightenment would finally come flooding forth to its conclusion—to 
the extent that it would reach as far as the United States and lead directly to the 
end of racism against African Americans as well.258 
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 Herzl broke with earlier German Jewish anticolonialists in a number of 
ways. First and foremost was a rejection of occupying the same space as their 
colonizers. Second, Herzl’s Zionism turned to—and to an extent invented—the 
“nationalist” heroes of the Jewish past. The Zionist “nationalist” hero was a 
tragic one, willing to risk and lose, and even die, for the cause of the Jewish 
people. Examples include those who chose death at Masada rather than 
surrender to the Romans, who Herzl idolized alongside the failed seventeenth 
century messiah Shabbatai Zvi as tragic national heroes.259  
 Herzl also turned away from Continental Europe and toward the United 
States of America as a model for the Jewish immigrant nation he envisioned. 
Notably, it is not for its republican form of government that Herzl looks to 
America, but rather as a model of industry and ingenuity possible for an 
immigrant nation. American cultural strength is juxtaposed against European 
weakness, and America is invoked as a role model repeatedly.260 This illustrates 
a clear break in the aspirational gaze of German Jewish anticolonialism, which 
even for Herzl had still been focused upon France prior to the Dreyfus Affair. 
 While Zionism as a political movement began in a German Jewish 
anticolonial context, through the person of Herzl, Zionism quickly became a 
more pan-Ashkenazic phenomenon. With the First Zionist Congress, in Basel, 
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Switzerland in 1897, Zionism was already officially an international 
phenomenon. Indeed, it was not long before the movement’s intellectual and 
political leaders were largely Ostjuden in background.261 With this being the 
case, the question of orientalism again comes to the fore. 
 The majority representation of Ostjuden within Zionism largely obviates 
the question of Zionist orientalism, at least as an extension of alleged German 
Jewish orientalism—and further illustrates the broader hybrid Ashkenazic 
culture over Riegert’s characterization of German Jews as agents of empire 
against the Ostjuden. Indeed, disenchanted maskilim and Wissenschaft 
intellectuals of Eastern European origin quickly became the dominant shapers of 
Zionism both politically and culturally. Yet, the charge of orientalism, and by 
extension Western Colonialism and Imperialism, against Zionism persists—
despite its anticolonial origins and existential repudiation of both.  
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Conclusion: Islam, Capitulation, and Continuity 
 Having laid out the twin births of antisemitism and orientalism, and 
traced a continuity of Jewish anticolonialism since those twin births, especially 
among German Jews, which clearly demonstrates the non-orientalist background 
of Zionism, it is useful to conclude with a discussion of continuities. Before 
looking at some of the particular continuities that have persisted into the period 
of Israeli statehood, an exploration of Herzl’s conception of Zionism’s 
relationship with Islam is germane. 
Herzl and Islam 
 While the Zionist anticolonial turn meant giving up Muslim Spain as a 
role model for the possibilities of emancipation into German society and Europe 
at large, this did not result in a rejection of Muslim Spain as a role model 
entirely.262 The idea of Jews as a mediator for advancing culture remained, 
though this was modified to a more national perspective, with Zionism 
facilitating the realization of the model in a way that emancipation could not—
as noted above. For a brief time, however, Zionism existed as an attempt for a 
literal recreation of the Jewish-Muslim hybridity of Muslim Spain within an 
Ottoman context. 
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 Early in the Zionist movement, Herzl considered the idea of gaining a 
sort of rental charter from the Ottoman sultan for a Zionist community in 
Palestine, structured along the lines of the older German Jewish semi-
autonomous communities prior to the age of emancipation.263 There was even an 
unsuccessful attempt to bring this into reality; Herzl held meetings and 
negotiations on the matter with Sultan Abdülhamid II until 1902.264 This phase 
of Herzl’s activity is usually considered little more than a footnote in the history 
of Zionism—especially because the British Empire took possession of Palestine 
after the First World War fulfilled the originating impulse of Western 
Colonialism and Imperialism, bringing more than six centuries of Ottoman 
power to an end. Be that as it may, Herzl’s original assessment and intentions 
for Zionism under Ottoman auspices demonstrate a starkly non-orientalist 
perspective. 
 It is obvious enough that Herzl did not view Islam as an inherent threat, 
which alone obviates any foundational orientalism within the movement. There 
is, however, more than this. In the same manner that Herzl had transformed 
Jewishness itself into anticolonialism, Herzl reformulated the ideal of Muslim 
Spain into a vision of a hybrid anticolonial culture that could counterbalance 
Western Colonialism and Imperialism. He even presented the idea of an 
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Ottoman Zionist charter to Abdülhamid II in these terms—as a means to reverse 
the ever growing threat presented by the West.265    
 This was not merely telling the sultan what Herzl thought he wanted to 
hear. It must be remembered that German Jewish anticolonialism had been 
vocally critical of Western Colonialism and Imperialism since Moses 
Mendelssohn, and this disdain only intensified through the Wissenschaft phase 
as the situation of German Jews continued to deteriorate.266 Herzl inherited and 
carried forward these sentiments in his reformulation of the Muslim Spanish role 
model.  
 This is most clear in his utopian novel Altneuland. Often, his novel is 
decried as thoroughly orientalist, especially in the field of Postcolonial 
Studies.267 However, such assessments do not account for Zionism as an 
anticolonial movement, nor for Herzl’s particular conception of a Muslim-
Jewish hybrid culture in anticolonial terms. Within Altneuland, very similar to 
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the model of Muslim Spain envisioned first by German Jewish maskilim, the 
cultural, intellectual, and economic flowering of the Jews under Ottoman 
auspices flows outward to quickly return Ottoman society to the elevated state it 
enjoyed before Western Colonialism and Imperialism began to encroach upon 
it.268  
 In Herzl’s assessment, this revitalized hybrid culture would be more than 
a match for the combined power of Christian Europe, to the extent that he 
presumed that any attempted attack on such a revitalized Ottoman Empire would 
quickly unravel into a repeat of the confused warring amongst Christian 
crusaders during the medieval period.269 This idea of Muslims and Jews as a 
joint force to curtail the apparent barbarity within the failure of Western 
liberalism is a key element of Altneuland. This imagined revitalized hybrid 
culture benefited Jews, Arabs, and Turks alike.270 The most significant point 
here is that whatever degradation there was among Turks and Arabs in the 
realms of culture and economics was the result of a persistent and growing 
Western Colonial and Imperial encroachment, rather than any inherent racial or 
Islamic “backwardness.”  
 Indeed, the “old-new” land referred to in the title is intended as much to 
be a restoration of Jews to their national homeland in Palestine as it is to be a 
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restoration of the hybrid Muslim-Jewish culture that reached a pinnacle higher 
than had been reached by either culture separately. This is clear in the framing 
of the characters—a combined group of Spanish Jews, Eastern European Jews, 
Turks, and Arabs have created a society so advanced that the German and 
German Jewish author surrogates can only look upon it all in dumbfounded 
amazement. Herzl’s conception of a Muslim Spain reborn under anticolonial 
auspices was indeed utopian, even naïve and fanciful. It was not, however, 
orientalist.   
 It is clear enough from the above discussion on Herzl’s approach to the 
Ottoman Empire as a whole that there was no essential orientalism toward 
Palestinian Arabs within Zionism itself.271 The inconsistent relationship between 
Zionists and Palestinian Arabs during the late Ottoman period and early 
Mandatory Palestine offers strong support for this notion in a peculiar way: most 
Zionists didn’t think of the Palestinian Arabs as a real threat to their movement 
at all until 1929.272 And even then, such considerations were not in the terms of 
“inherent threat” that define orientalism as a phenomenon. This has remained 
                                                 
271 Derek J. Penslar moderates depictions of Herzl as an exemplar of orientalist colonialism 
somewhat, noting that Herzl’s perspective of Palestinian Arabs was varied, and not essentially 
colonial, but rather more benignly orientalist. Be that as it may, this is an extension of Penslar’s 
earlier compromise on the matter of Zionist colonialism, as part of a more general attempt to 
facilitate an end to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. See, in order of publication Derek J. Penslar 
“Zionism, Colonialism, and Postcolonialism,” The Journal of Israeli History 20 no 2-3 (2001): 
84-98; Derek J. Penslar, “Herzl and the Palestinian Arabs: Myth and Counter-Myth,” The 
Journal of Israeli History 24 no. 1 (2005): 65–77; Kalmar and Penslar (eds.), Orientalism and 
the Jews (2005).   
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true even through the course of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, as Israel remains quite 
willing to maintain its peace treaties with former enemies in the conflict. 
 Before the Arab-Israeli Conflict began to crystalize as a contest between 
the national movements of Jews and Palestinian Arabs, and even after, Zionism 
was far more concerned with its own affairs than it was with those of Palestinian 
Arabs.273 It is important to bear in mind that this self-attention was in itself an 
adaptation, on the part of Zionists, of the older model of anticolonial mimicry 
that had previously tried to remake German Jews into “Germans of the Mosaic 
faith”—as a means of ultimate decolonization into German society.  In the 
Zionist case, this took the form of rebirth, into a “new Jew” with his or her own 
capacity to live a national life.274 Prior to the time of the British Mandate, many 
Zionists besides Herzl were open and even enthusiastic about the prospect of 
pursing this rebirth on a path of Muslim-Jewish cultural hybridity.275  
Zionist Capitulation and the End of Ottoman Power 
 The end of this possibility had much to do with Zionists and Palestinian 
Arabs both finding themselves unexpectedly under Western Imperial auspices. 
This moment was the end of the Zionism of Herzl’s most hopeful imaginings, 
because it meant that Muslim Spain’s glory as a hybrid society was now fully 
                                                 




consigned to the past. There is great irony in this, as Zionists found themselves 
suddenly recolonized by the West they were attempting to be free of.  
 From this point on, the direction of Zionism had no choice but to change, 
because the old discourse had returned—the Yishuv (Zionist community of 
Palestine) had to convince a Western colonizer that it was sufficiently Western 
to gain emancipation into the society of nations. At length, Herzl’s initial 
rejection of capitulation could not stand. An even greater irony, this change put 
Zionists in a position of advantage they did not previously have against their 
nascent Palestinian Arab nationalist rivals. Jews had half a millennia of 
experience in how to deal with the power structures and sensibilities of Western 
colonizers which the Palestinian Arabs, or any other colonized group, utterly 
lacked. Despite that greater experience, Israel has continued to remain largely a 
pariah in the international community. 
  In this particular way, Zionism must be viewed as a failure—at least in 
the anticolonial framework that Theodor Herzl first devised. Herzl believed that 
the establishment of a Jewish national home or state would normalize the 
situation of world Jewry, bringing an end to antisemitism and making the Jews a 
nation like any other.276 This has not happened. Indeed, the emancipation 
discourse that so occupied German Jewish anticolonialists has essentially re-
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manifested itself on an international scale. The international order has remained 
one of essentially unchallenged Western hegemony since the destruction of the 
Ottoman Empire—which, as we’ve seen, was the entire animus of the history of 
the Western Colonialism and Imperialism that created the current international 
order in the first place.277  
 Why wouldn’t that order, fundamentally informed by the same cultural 
premises that formed Western Colonialism and Imperialism, cast a dubious eye 
at a Jewish state? Notably, in the disparate attempts by antisemitism scholarship 
to parse anti-Zionism, the elements that formed the contours of the old 
emancipation debate engaged by the Wissenschaft scholars and maskilim before 
them are clearly visible—in each instance where the Jewishness of Israel is 
addressed as an inherent negative that must be resolved in order for the state to 
truly be a part of the international community. In this sense, attributions to 
Zionism such as orientalism, Western Colonialism and Imperialism, even 
Nazism, follow a certain logical continuity. The “postcolonial” world order, 
with its Western-derived culture, defines itself as a community of states contra-
orientalism, contra-Western Colonialism and Imperialism, and contra-Nazism. 
To transpose those things onto a Jewish state makes sense in that context, and 
fits the historical pattern. 
                                                 
277 We should not be confused by the “Eastern bloc,” “Western bloc” language which pervaded 
during the Cold War. The Soviet bloc, a colonizing empire in its own right, was merely the 
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 Thus, Zionism finds itself within a neo-emancipation discourse, mired in 
an arrested process of anticolonial mimicry. In the eyes of an increasingly global 
West, the more Israel attempts to resemble a state inhering contemporary 
Western-derived values, the more orientalist it is perceived, the more colonial 
and imperial, the more Naziesque. Indeed, this highlights the true failure of 
Zionist anticolonialism as Herzl originally imagined it, as a hybrid Jewish and 
Muslim culture within the Islamic sphere, beyond the reach of a dominant 
Western discourse. Such a sphere no longer exists. The persistence of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict has only compounded this problem, as figures such as Edward 
Said and others have succeeded in guiding that dominant discourse toward an 
inherent association between Israel as a Jewish state and traits the West deems 
inherently negative.  
 This thesis has thoroughly illustrated that Zionism is anticolonial and 
non-orientalist at its core, and thus beyond the scope of Western Colonialism 
and Imperialism.  That Said and Postcolonial studies look at the same history of 
the emancipation discourse as proof of the opposite, while deeply ironic, makes 
its own sense beyond a polemical context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The 
process of German Jewish emancipation was, after all, a discourse about the 
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